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Abstract:	  Placing	  the	  creation	  of	  emergency	  powers	  for	  the	  internal	  security	  of	  the	  state	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  framing	  and	  adoption	  of	  the	  Federal	  Constitution,	  this	  essay	  offers	  a	  new	  perspective	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  American	  liberal	  state.	  In	  the	  period	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  domestic	  insurrections	  raised	  serious	  problems	  for	  the	  new	  state	  and	  federal	  governments,	  placing	  questions	  of	  internal	  security	  at	  the	  center	  of	  public	  authority.	  I	  argue	  that	  overcoming	  the	  difficulties	  posed	  by	  popular	  rebellion	  required	  James	  Madison	  and	  other	  American	  statecrafters	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  specific	  problem	  of	  statebuilding,	  one	  that	  scholars	  have	  largely	  ignored.	  Confronting	  the	  rebels	  meant	  building	  new	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  as	  well	  as	  reconciling	  the	  expansion	  of	  federal	  power	  with	  the	  ideological	  traditions	  of	  the	  new	  republic.	  These	  were	  critical	  matters	  in	  the	  constitutional	  deliberations	  of	  1787-­‐1788.	  I	  make	  the	  case	  that	  Madison	  and	  his	  Federalists	  allies	  devised	  a	  set	  of	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  federal	  power	  that	  the	  insurrections	  of	  the	  1780s	  had	  posed.	  Constitutionally,	  Madison	  developed	  a	  system	  that	  made	  the	  federal	  government	  responsible	  for	  suppressing	  rebellions	  and	  granted	  it	  wide-­‐ranging	  authority	  to	  act	  in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  Institutionally,	  the	  Federalists	  granted	  the	  federal	  government	  unqualified	  power	  to	  recruit	  and	  maintain	  armies	  as	  well	  as	  an	  expansive	  power	  to	  tax	  and	  borrow	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  them	  as	  a	  way	  of	  asserting	  this	  new	  authority.	  Most	  important	  was	  James	  Madison’s	  effort	  to	  rationalize	  and	  justify	  the	  new	  emergency	  powers.	  The	  new	  provisions	  ran	  up	  against	  a	  powerful	  ideological	  barrier.	  They	  posed	  serious	  problems	  for	  a	  republican	  principle	  holding	  that	  both	  political	  legitimacy	  (or	  right)	  and	  armed	  force	  (or	  might)	  resided	  with	  the	  people	  themselves.	  According	  to	  this	  principle,	  the	  might	  of	  the	  people—not	  the	  federal	  government—should	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underpin	  internal	  security	  in	  the	  republic.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  James	  Madison	  engineered	  an	  ideological	  transformation	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  republican	  government—until	  now	  inadequately	  recognized	  by	  scholars—to	  legitimize	  the	  new	  federal	  security	  power.	  Realizing	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  classical	  republican	  tradition	  for	  issues	  of	  internal	  security,	  Madison	  carved	  out	  a	  sphere	  for	  federal	  emergency	  power	  by	  dismantling	  and	  setting	  aside	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might,	  which	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  people	  themselves.	  He	  replaced	  it	  with	  the	  fundamental	  tenets	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism,	  which	  underscored	  the	  primacy	  of	  constitutional	  government,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  protection	  of	  rights.	  Granting	  the	  federal	  government	  emergency	  powers	  was,	  then,	  intimately	  connected	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  in	  post-­‐revolutionary	  America.	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  On	  February	  19,	  1787	  at	  a	  session	  of	  the	  Confederation	  Congress,	  James	  Madison	  rose	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  federal	  government’s	  failed	  attempts	  to	  mobilize	  an	  armed	  force	  to	  quell	  the	  Massachusetts	  regulation	  of	  1786-­‐1787,	  commonly	  known	  as	  Shays’	  Rebellion.2	  The	  rebellion	  first	  broke	  out	  in	  August	  and	  wreaked	  havoc	  throughout	  central	  and	  western	  Massachusetts	  and	  neighboring	  states	  the	  following	  winter.	  After	  a	  series	  of	  frustrated	  attempts	  to	  muster	  the	  militia	  and	  raise	  an	  army	  to	  repress	  the	  “traitorous	  proceedings”	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1786,	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Henry	  Knox	  and	  the	  Massachusetts	  authorities,	  led	  by	  the	  old	  revolutionaries	  James	  Bowdoin	  and	  Samuel	  Adams,	  decided	  to	  invite	  the	  central	  government	  to	  claim	  new	  powers	  over	  domestic	  rebellion	  and	  forcibly	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  tumults.	  But	  while	  the	  central	  government	  embraced	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  new	  power,	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  Congress	  was	  even	  more	  powerless	  to	  act	  than	  the	  state	  government	  and	  could	  only	  observe	  as	  the	  rebellion	  raged	  throughout	  Massachusetts.	  According	  to	  Madison’s	  analysis,	  the	  problem	  of	  federal	  power	  boiled	  down	  to	  constitutional,	  institutional,	  and	  ideological	  factors.	  First,	  “it	  appeared	  rather	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  an	  interference	  of	  Congress	  in	  the	  internal	  controversies	  of	  a	  State	  with	  the	  tenor	  of	  the	  Confederation	  which	  does	  not	  authorize	  it	  explicitly,	  and	  leaves	  to	  the	  States	  all	  powers	  not	  expressly	  delegated.”	  Second,	  Congress	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  fiscal	  or	  military	  capacity	  to	  act.	  It	  did	  not	  control	  a	  body	  of	  soldiers	  to	  deploy	  and	  its	  attempts	  to	  request	  money	  from	  its	  constitutive	  states	  to	  raise	  a	  new	  army	  were	  met	  with	  indifference.	  Finally,	  federal	  imposition	  did	  not	  accord	  with	  republican	  ideology.	  It	  violated	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“the	  principles	  of	  Republican	  Gov.,”	  noted	  Madison,	  which	  as	  they	  rest	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  majority,	  necessarily	  suppose	  power	  and	  right	  always	  to	  be	  on	  the	  same	  side.”3	  	  Madison‘s	  analysis	  captures	  well	  the	  problem	  that	  popular	  rebellion	  posed	  for	  the	  nascent	  United	  States.	  The	  revolutionary	  war	  with	  the	  British	  Empire	  had	  come	  to	  an	  end,	  but	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  independent	  American	  republic	  generated	  new	  tensions	  and	  conflicts.	  Internal	  challenges	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  new	  state	  and	  federal	  governments	  continued,	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  intensified.4	  The	  US	  had	  not	  subdued	  Native	  American	  power.5	  New	  domestic	  insurrections—of	  farmers,	  urban	  laborers,	  frontier	  settlers,	  and	  slaves—were	  erupting	  in	  multiple	  locations	  and	  threatening	  state	  security.6	  Overcoming	  these	  internal	  conflicts	  required	  James	  Madison	  and	  other	  American	  statemakers	  not	  simply	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  giving	  the	  federal	  government	  special	  emergency	  powers	  but	  also	  to	  make	  such	  expansion	  of	  federal	  power	  consonant	  with	  the	  political	  ideals	  of	  the	  new	  republic.	  Both	  the	  enlargement	  of	  federal	  power	  and	  its	  justification	  were	  urgent	  matters	  in	  the	  constitutional	  deliberations	  of	  1787-­‐1788.	  In	  its	  general	  contours,	  this	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  has	  been	  made	  before.	  But	  scholars	  of	  the	  founding	  moment	  have	  generally	  not	  understood	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  domestic	  insurrections	  both	  fueled	  the	  creation	  of	  special	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  and	  triggered	  an	  important	  ideological	  transformation	  in	  how	  Americans	  thought	  about	  their	  government.	  This	  essay	  is	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  the	  latter.	  It	  will	  offer	  a	  new	  perspective	  on	  how	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  Constitution	  was	  part	  of	  the	  story	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism.	  Madison,	  not	  surprisingly,	  was	  at	  the	  center	  of	  this	  story.	  	  	  Scholarship	  of	  the	  early	  United	  States	  generally	  privileges	  individual	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liberty	  over	  state	  coercion.	  A	  distinguished	  tradition	  for	  downplaying	  the	  role	  of	  government	  stretches	  from	  Louis	  Hartz	  and	  Oscar	  Handlin,	  via	  Bernard	  Bailyn	  and	  Gordon	  Wood,	  and	  through	  the	  new	  social	  and	  cultural	  histories.7	  Scholarly	  dismissal	  of	  state	  power	  owes	  much	  to	  prevailing	  interpretations	  of	  the	  framing	  and	  adoption	  of	  Federal	  Constitution,	  and	  particularly	  the	  thought	  of	  James	  Madison	  thereon.	  The	  story	  most	  frequently	  told	  centers	  on	  the	  institutional	  make-­‐up,	  or	  structure,	  of	  government	  itself	  and	  highlights	  liberal	  restraints	  and	  limitations	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  state	  power	  such	  as	  checks	  and	  balances,	  limited	  government,	  the	  separation	  of	  powers,	  size	  of	  the	  political	  sphere,	  and	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights.	  Chiefly	  concerned	  with	  the	  anxiety	  of	  Madison	  and	  other	  framers	  about	  abuses	  of	  legislative	  power	  in	  state	  and	  federal	  governments—problems	  well	  illustrated	  in	  Federalist	  papers	  10	  and	  51—scholars	  have	  been	  mostly	  silent	  on	  issues	  of	  emergency	  and	  internal	  security.8	  And,	  in	  more	  general	  terms,	  they	  consistently	  regard	  liberal	  principles	  simply	  as	  antithetical	  to	  state	  power;	  liberalism	  is	  a	  vehicle	  for	  its	  restraint	  and	  limitation.	  An	  older	  literature	  that	  considered	  aspects	  of	  early	  U.S	  security	  legislation—most	  notably	  the	  laws	  of	  treason—similarly	  subscribed	  to	  the	  story	  of	  increasing	  constitutional	  constraints	  and	  protection	  of	  rights,	  and	  saw	  security	  provisions	  as	  deeply	  in	  tension	  with	  liberal	  principles.9	  New	  scholarship	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  slavery,	  of	  course,	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  security	  considerations	  in	  framing	  the	  Constitution	  but	  generally	  confines	  its	  exploration	  to	  the	  Founders’	  anxieties	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  slave	  rebellions.10	  	  More	  recently,	  new	  social	  historians,	  concentrating	  on	  popular	  agency,	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  insurgency	  and	  rebellion	  were	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  post-­‐revolutionary	  and	  early	  national	  history.	  While	  they	  have	  made	  an	  invaluable	  
	   7	  
contribution	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  popular	  movements	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  political	  change	  from	  below,	  they	  have	  had	  little	  new	  to	  say	  about	  state	  reaction	  from	  above.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  argue	  that	  popular	  uprisings	  did	  not	  constitute	  so	  much	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  and	  preservation	  of	  the	  federal	  state	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  grievances	  about	  the	  internal	  arrangements	  and	  democratic	  character	  of	  governments	  in	  the	  new	  republic.11	  Insurrection	  was	  one	  way	  for	  the	  people	  to	  take	  back	  unresponsive	  governments	  from	  the	  aristocratic	  elite	  and	  make	  them	  an	  instrument	  of	  popular	  sovereignty.	  On	  the	  other,	  these	  scholars	  make	  the	  case	  that	  elites	  regarded	  insurrections	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  excess	  of	  democracy	  and	  sought	  to	  tame	  it	  through	  a	  Federal	  Constitution	  that	  moved	  power	  away	  from	  state	  governments	  and	  placed	  it	  in	  a	  federal	  government	  susceptible	  to	  elite	  control	  through	  filters	  on	  representation,	  resizing	  electoral	  districts,	  and	  implementing	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  other	  limitations	  on	  state	  power.12	  Similarly,	  a	  growing	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  the	  early	  American	  state	  has	  itself	  neglected	  questions	  of	  internal	  security.	  These	  scholars	  have	  greatly	  advanced	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  government	  in	  early	  U.S.	  history,	  and	  this	  essay	  owes	  much	  to	  their	  insights.13	  Yet,	  despite	  a	  fairly	  recent	  burst	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  and	  other	  theorists	  of	  emergency	  powers	  and	  “states	  of	  exception,”	  students	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  governance	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  and	  early	  nineteenth	  centuries,	  have	  tended	  to	  overlook	  these	  issues.14	  This	  essay	  tells	  a	  different	  story.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  framing	  of	  emergency	  powers	  into	  the	  Federal	  Constitution,	  I	  put	  forward	  a	  new	  argument	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism	  and	  the	  American	  liberal	  state,	  which	  it	  prospectively	  created.	  At	  the	  center	  of	  this	  story	  was	  James	  Madison’s	  effort	  to	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rationalize	  the	  new	  emergency	  powers	  and	  reconcile	  them	  with	  the	  ideological	  principles	  of	  the	  new	  republic.	  Madison’s	  thinking	  on	  these	  issues	  has	  hitherto	  eluded	  scholars,	  who	  usually	  focus	  on	  his	  concern	  with	  legislative	  tyranny,	  filtering	  representation	  and	  extending	  the	  republic	  in	  Federalist	  10.	  Yet,	  as	  Madison	  and	  his	  Federalist	  collaborators	  sought	  to	  endow	  the	  federal	  government	  with	  internal	  security	  powers,	  they	  soon	  realized	  that	  their	  efforts	  were	  imperiled	  by	  a	  republican	  principle	  holding	  that	  not	  only	  political	  legitimacy	  (or	  right)	  but	  also	  armed	  force	  (or	  might)	  should	  reside	  with	  the	  people	  themselves.	  According	  to	  this	  principle,	  the	  coercive	  force	  of	  the	  people—not	  the	  federal	  government—should	  underpin	  and	  preserve	  the	  internal	  security	  of	  the	  republic.	  I	  contend	  that	  Madison	  orchestrated	  an	  ideological	  transformation	  to	  overcome	  these	  republican	  objections	  and	  expand	  federal	  power	  to	  issues	  of	  internal	  security.	  He	  carved	  out	  a	  sphere	  for	  new	  federal	  powers	  by	  dismantling	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might,	  which	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  people,	  and	  introducing	  novel	  elements	  from	  constitutional	  liberalism,	  which	  underscored	  the	  primacy	  of	  constitutional	  government,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  protection	  of	  rights.15	  Granting	  the	  federal	  government	  new	  emergency	  powers	  was	  in	  this	  case	  not	  inconsistent	  with,	  or	  restrained	  by,	  liberal	  principles.	  Rather	  their	  creation	  was	  intimately	  connected	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  in	  post-­‐revolutionary	  America.	  This	  essay	  divides	  the	  analysis	  of	  federal	  security	  powers	  into	  four	  parts.	  The	  first	  section	  demonstrates	  that,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  popular	  rebellion	  emerged	  as	  a	  new	  problem	  of	  governance	  and	  placed	  questions	  of	  internal	  security	  at	  the	  center	  of	  public	  authority.	  The	  second	  part	  reconstructs	  how	  Madison	  looked	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  ancient	  and	  modern	  confederacies	  to	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find	  a	  way	  to	  insert	  special	  emergency	  powers	  into	  the	  federal	  constitutional	  blueprint.	  The	  third	  section	  illustrates	  how	  constitutional	  provisions	  granting	  the	  federal	  government	  virtually	  unlimited	  power	  to	  recruit	  and	  maintain	  armies,	  as	  well	  as	  expansive	  powers	  to	  tax	  and	  borrow	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  them,	  created	  the	  institutional	  capacity	  to	  assert	  this	  new	  authority.	  The	  final	  part	  shows	  that	  the	  insertion	  of	  new	  powers	  to	  suppress	  the	  internal	  resistance	  of	  the	  citizenry	  compelled	  Madison	  to	  engineer	  an	  ideological	  transformation	  that	  marked	  the	  demise	  of	  republicanism	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism.	  	  	  
I.	  	  	  Puzzling:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Rebellion	  	  Madison	  and	  his	  Federalist	  collaborators	  did	  not	  react	  immediately	  to	  domestic	  insurrections	  by	  creating	  federal	  emergency	  powers,	  for	  statebuilders	  must	  often	  “puzzle	  before	  they	  power.”16	  As	  the	  colonists	  declared	  independence	  and	  formed	  new	  states,	  popular	  rebellion	  was	  transformed	  into	  a	  new	  governmental	  task.	  There	  emerged	  a	  new	  political	  determination	  to	  put	  down	  insurgencies,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  new	  conceptual	  framework	  to	  analyze	  the	  problem	  they	  posed.	  Previously,	  the	  insurrections	  of	  ordinary	  white	  men	  had	  not	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  security	  of	  governments.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  colonial	  elites	  often	  tolerated	  them	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐legitimate	  element	  of	  the	  social	  order.	  In	  the	  decade	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Revolution,	  popular	  uprisings	  were,	  in	  fact,	  encouraged.	  As	  Pauline	  Maier	  has	  argued,	  they	  were	  viewed	  as	  a	  defensible	  way	  to	  bring	  attention	  to	  grievances	  once	  legal	  channels	  had	  been	  exhausted.17	  	  But	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  independent	  federal	  state	  in	  America	  gave	  rise	  to	  new	  tensions	  and	  conflicts.	  The	  revolutionary	  elite	  realized	  that	  the	  protection	  of	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feeble	  American	  sovereignty	  not	  only	  depended	  on	  overthrowing	  the	  British	  Empire	  but	  also	  on	  establishing	  control,	  domestically,	  over	  the	  ex-­‐colonial	  population	  and	  guarding	  against	  internal	  threats.18	  An	  end	  to	  internal	  disorder	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  cessation	  of	  war	  after	  the	  1783	  treaty	  in	  Paris.	  The	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  states,	  individually	  and	  united,	  was	  soon	  recognized,	  internationally,	  by	  the	  powers	  of	  Europe.19	  Yet,	  domestically,	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  law	  was	  still	  fiercely	  contested.	  As	  an	  impressive	  body	  of	  scholarship	  has	  demonstrated,	  the	  states	  did	  not	  command	  loyalty,	  and,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  multiple	  episodes	  of	  insurgency,	  their	  ability	  to	  uphold	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  was	  uncertain.20	  Throughout	  the	  1780s,	  insurgents	  defied	  authority	  in	  the	  fields,	  backcountries,	  and	  streets	  of	  Virginia,	  Massachusetts,	  New	  York,	  New	  Hampshire	  and	  North	  Carolina,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Appalachian	  frontier.	  Vermont	  proved	  successful	  in	  wresting	  sovereignty	  from	  New	  York	  and	  establishing	  itself	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  outside	  of	  the	  Union.	  Western	  Massachusetts	  was	  in	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  civil	  war	  and	  in	  northeastern	  parts	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  managed	  to	  secede,	  creating	  the	  new	  state	  of	  Maine.21	  Connecticut	  Yankees	  in	  the	  Wyoming	  Valley,	  as	  well	  as	  settlers	  on	  the	  western	  frontier	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  who	  later	  became	  the	  so-­‐called	  Whiskey	  rebels,	  successfully	  deflected	  the	  state’s	  authority.	  Insurgents	  in	  Delaware	  and	  the	  eastern	  counties	  of	  Maryland	  moved	  to	  form	  their	  own	  state.	  On	  the	  western	  frontier	  of	  Virginia,	  Kentucky	  and	  Washington	  and	  Franklin	  counties	  continued	  to	  challenge	  control	  and	  authority.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  such	  revolts—ranging	  from	  frontier	  independence	  movements	  and	  settler-­‐native	  conflict	  to	  farmers’	  tax	  resistance	  and	  politics-­‐in-­‐the-­‐streets	  and	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  slave	  insurrection—made	  issues	  of	  domestic	  order	  and	  state	  security	  paramount	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  elite.	  As	  a	  
	   11	  
North	  Carolina	  congressional	  delegate	  remarked,	  “the	  spirit”	  of	  insurrection	  was	  “epidemic.”22	  No	  single	  episode	  of	  domestic	  insurrection	  illuminates	  the	  post-­‐revolutionary	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  new	  governmental	  problem	  better	  than	  Shays’	  Rebellion.23	  The	  rebellion—an	  armed	  uprising	  in	  the	  western	  counties	  of	  Massachusetts—erupted	  in	  August	  1786	  and	  created	  chaos	  throughout	  the	  following	  winter	  until	  a	  quasi-­‐private	  army	  funded	  directly	  by	  the	  mercantile	  elite	  in	  Boston	  suppressed	  it.24	  Prompted	  by	  heavy	  debts,	  mounting	  taxation,	  and	  shortage	  of	  hard	  currency,	  farmers	  and	  townspeople	  west	  of	  Worcester	  County,	  up	  to	  1,500	  strong,	  resorted	  to	  closing	  courts	  by	  force,	  prevented	  the	  execution	  of	  laws,	  and	  threatened	  to	  seize	  the	  federal	  armory	  at	  Springfield.	  The	  reaction	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  government	  exemplifies	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  elite	  perspective	  towards	  popular	  insurgency.	  Throughout	  the	  winter,	  the	  government’s	  position	  emerged	  through	  a	  series	  of	  proclamations	  and	  announcements,	  circular	  letters	  in	  newspapers,	  secret	  reports	  to	  Congress,	  and	  public	  reports	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Massachusetts.	  Three	  key	  figures—Samuel	  Adams,	  Governor	  James	  Bowdoin	  and	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Henry	  Knox—played	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  forming	  elite	  perceptions	  of	  the	  rebellion.	  Taken	  together,	  their	  written	  and	  spoken	  record	  created	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  rebellion	  as	  a	  treasonable	  threat	  to	  the	  “safety	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.”25	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  Revolution,	  established	  authorities	  often	  submitted	  to	  various	  kinds	  of	  popular	  pressure	  expressed	  outside	  of	  constitutional	  channels.	  But	  rather	  than	  redressing	  grievances—or	  seriously	  considering	  insurgents’	  demands—the	  Massachusetts	  General	  Court	  passed	  a	  riot	  act;	  suspended	  habeas	  corpus;	  authorized	  preventive	  arrests	  by	  state	  warrant;	  and	  tried	  to	  raise	  an	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army	  to	  subdue	  forcibly	  the	  rebels.26	  Governor	  Bowdoin	  issued,	  on	  September	  2,	  1786,	  a	  proclamation	  against	  the	  initial	  court	  closings	  denouncing	  the	  insurgents	  and	  their	  actions	  as	  “treasonable”	  and	  aiming	  to	  “subvert	  all	  law	  and	  government,	  dissolve	  our	  excellent	  Constitution,	  and	  introduce	  universal	  riot,	  anarchy,	  and	  confusion.”27	  This	  statement	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  General	  Court	  and	  Governor	  proclamations,	  reiterating	  this	  view.	  “The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Insurgents	  is	  to	  annihilate	  our	  present	  happy	  Constitution.”28	  Shortly	  after	  Bowdoin's	  initial	  announcement,	  Samuel	  Adams,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  General	  Court	  and	  one	  of	  Bowdoin's	  closest	  advisors,	  wrote	  a	  circular	  letter	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  Boston	  town	  meeting	  that	  he	  himself	  had	  convened	  and	  moderated.	  The	  letter,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  Centinel	  newspaper,	  denounced	  the	  insurgents	  as	  threatening	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  Union.29	  As	  Massachusetts	  Governor	  James	  Bowdoin	  frequently	  emphasized,	  “strict	  obedience	  to	  the	  laws	  …	  is	  so	  essential	  to	  the	  peace	  and	  safety	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.”30	  The	  Massachusetts	  authorities’	  reaction	  to	  Shays’	  Rebellion	  suggests	  that	  republican	  ideology	  underlay	  the	  new	  problem	  of	  rebellion.	  The	  authorities	  argued	  that	  republican	  principles	  of	  popular	  government	  and	  majority	  rule	  rendered	  popular	  insurrection	  illegitimate	  and	  treasonous.	  According	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  popular	  insurgency	  was	  the	  natural	  concomitant	  of	  monarchical	  governments	  and	  unnatural	  to	  republican	  ones.	  Few	  captured	  this	  position	  as	  well	  as	  Samuel	  Adams.	  Insurgency	  had	  “servd	  an	  excellent	  Purpose”	  against	  the	  British,	  when	  the	  colonists	  had	  been	  “taxed	  by	  Great	  Britain	  unconstitutionally	  and	  illegally.”31	  No	  one	  had	  to	  “regret	  the	  Share	  he	  may	  then	  have	  had	  in	  them.”32	  But	  now,	  after	  the	  Revolution,	  Americans	  were	  “subjected	  to	  no	  laws,	  but	  such	  as	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are	  made	  by	  a	  Legislature	  of	  our	  own	  election,”	  and	  governed	  by	  a	  government	  of	  their	  “own	  consent,	  taxed	  by	  our	  own	  representatives	  only,	  and	  controlled	  by	  no	  authority	  but	  what	  is	  derived	  from	  ourselves.”33	  As	  Americans	  now	  had	  “constitutional	  and	  regular	  Governments	  and	  all	  our	  Men	  in	  Authority	  depend	  upon	  the	  annual	  and	  free	  Elections	  of	  the	  People,”	  insurgency	  had	  “become	  dangerous.”	  For	  the	  redress	  of	  grievances	  it	  was	  “happy	  for	  us,	  that	  under	  our	  American	  Constitutions	  the	  Remedy	  is	  at	  hand,	  and	  in	  the	  Power	  of	  the	  great	  Body	  of	  the	  People	  …	  due	  Circumspection	  and	  Wisdom	  at	  the	  next	  Elections	  will	  set	  all	  right,	  without	  the	  aid”	  of	  insurgency.34	  Each	  act	  of	  the	  state	  was	  “constitutionally	  an	  act	  of	  the	  people”	  and	  “Constitutions	  provide	  a	  safe	  and	  easy	  method	  to	  redress	  any	  real	  grievances.”35	  As	  a	  result,	  Samuel	  Adams	  argued	  that,	  “in	  monarchies,	  the	  crime	  of	  treason	  and	  rebellion	  may	  admit	  of	  being	  pardoned	  or	  lightly	  punished;	  but	  the	  man	  who	  dares	  to	  rebel	  against	  the	  laws	  of	  a	  republic	  ought	  to	  suffer	  death.”36	  As	  the	  popular	  aspects	  of	  the	  new	  American	  governments	  were	  central	  to	  the	  newfound	  policy	  of	  suppressing	  rebellions,	  it	  became	  imperative	  to	  produce	  an	  identity	  between	  the	  will	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  and	  the	  state.	  Insisting	  that	  their	  government	  was	  the	  true	  expression	  of	  the	  people’s	  will—and	  the	  insurgents	  only	  a	  disgruntled	  minority—the	  Massachusetts	  authorities	  went	  to	  considerable	  lengths	  to	  maintain	  the	  identity	  between	  state	  and	  people	  throughout	  the	  conflict.	  Expressing	  its	  outrage	  at	  the	  insurgents’	  claim	  to	  represent	  the	  people’s	  legitimate	  grievances,	  the	  General	  Court	  announced	  that	  “some	  persons	  have	  artfully	  affected	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  government	  and	  people,	  as	  though	  their	  interests	  were	  different	  and	  even	  opposite.”	  To	  counter	  the	  endeavors	  of	  the	  “evil	  and	  designing”	  rebels	  to	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“alienate	  the	  affections	  of	  the	  people	  in	  general,	  from	  those	  who	  are	  concerned	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  government,”	  the	  Court	  wrote	  and	  distributed	  a	  40-­‐page	  report.37	  Similarly,	  the	  authorities	  wrote	  letters	  to	  be	  circulated	  in	  towns	  and	  counties.	  General	  Lincoln	  presented	  one	  such	  letter	  to	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  Northampton,	  in	  which	  he	  insisted	  that	  they	  had	  little	  in	  common	  with	  the	  “regulating	  party”	  over	  their	  own	  government.38	  The	  government	  reasoned	  that	  it	  needed	  to	  raise	  a	  much	  larger	  army—a	  force	  of	  “decided	  superiority”—for	  the	  purpose	  of	  “convincing	  the	  insurgents	  that	  they	  are	  not	  the	  people,	  as	  they	  affect	  to	  call	  themselves.”39	  	  	   The	  Massachusetts	  authorities	  argued	  that	  the	  disturbances	  stemmed	  from	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  insurgents	  themselves	  rather	  than	  oppressive	  government.	  In	  the	  1760s	  and	  1770s,	  the	  colonists	  had	  been	  provoked	  to	  rebel	  by	  an	  oppressive	  government,	  but	  now	  the	  peoples’	  character	  flaws	  caused	  the	  rebellion.	  The	  General	  Court's	  report	  was	  largely	  written	  to	  turn	  the	  tables	  and	  convince	  the	  public	  that	  the	  rebellion	  was	  not	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  state	  but	  of	  the	  insurgents	  themselves.	  It	  exonerated	  the	  government	  of	  accusations	  that	  public	  maladministration	  was	  the	  source	  of	  the	  rebellion.	  The	  government	  had	  not	  failed	  administratively	  or	  politically.	  The	  causes	  of	  the	  disturbances	  lay	  with	  the	  people's	  “habits	  of	  luxury.”	  The	  authorities,	  thus,	  turned	  the	  concept	  of	  dangerous	  “luxury”	  against	  the	  distraught	  farmers,	  claiming	  that	  they	  had	  spent	  beyond	  their	  means	  and	  incurred	  debts.40	  It	  was	  a	  corollary	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  fault	  lay	  with	  the	  insurgents,	  not	  the	  government,	  that	  the	  remedy	  should	  be	  sought	  in	  the	  latter’s	  reformation	  and	  punishment.	  In	  the	  place	  of	  redressing	  grievances—the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  the	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  tradition—the	  appropriate	  solution	  now	  consisted	  in	  a	  “reformation	  of	  manners.”	  The	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insurgents	  had	  to	  learn	  practices	  and	  “principles	  of	  industry,	  sobriety,	  [and]	  economy.”41	  Adams	  recommended	  “industry	  and	  frugality.”42	  But	  above	  all,	  the	  new	  perception	  of	  insurrection	  dictated	  that	  the	  most	  “vigorous	  and	  decisive	  measures”	  be	  taken	  to	  “provide	  for	  the	  security	  of	  the	  State.”43	  “Vigour,	  decision,	  and	  energy”	  would	  “terminate	  this	  unnatural,	  this	  unprovoked	  insurrection.”44	  The	  Massachusetts	  authorities	  sought	  to	  quell	  and	  suppress	  the	  rebellion	  by	  armed	  force.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  Massachusetts	  regulation	  illuminate	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  elite	  attitudes	  towards	  popular	  insurrections.	  More	  profoundly,	  it	  exposes	  the	  problem	  these	  revolts	  posed	  to	  the	  new	  state	  and	  federal	  governments:	  the	  governments	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  power	  to	  shut	  them	  down.	  After	  the	  initial	  court	  closings	  in	  Worcester,	  Bowdoin	  and	  his	  advisers	  instructed	  local	  state	  officials	  to	  summon	  the	  militia	  to	  defend	  the	  courts.	  Generally	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  insurgents’	  measures,	  the	  militia	  refused	  to	  muster,	  either	  by	  “flat	  denial”	  or	  “evasion	  or	  delay.”45	  The	  loyal	  militia	  members	  who	  actually	  came	  forth	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  sufficient	  force	  to	  check	  the	  regulators	  in	  Worcester	  and	  Springfield	  in	  September.	  Similarly,	  the	  General	  Court	  found	  that	  it	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  funds	  to	  raise	  an	  army	  to	  meet	  the	  rebels.46	  	  In	  early	  October	  the	  Massachusetts	  government,	  thus,	  sought	  from	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Henry	  Knox	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  Confederation	  troops.47	  But	  involving	  the	  Confederation	  government	  in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  the	  state	  created	  formidable	  constitutional,	  ideological,	  and	  administrative	  problems.	  It	  was	  unclear	  whether	  Congress	  had	  the	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  act.	  As	  James	  Madison	  pointed	  out,	  the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation	  were	  “silent”	  on	  domestic	  rebellion	  and	  “the	  hands	  of	  the	  federal	  authority”	  were	  tied.48	  	  It	  was	  “difficult	  to	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reconcile	  an	  interference	  of	  Congress	  in	  the	  internal	  controversies	  of	  a	  State	  with	  the	  tenor	  of	  the	  Confederation	  which	  does	  not	  authorize	  it	  expressly,	  and	  leaves	  to	  the	  States	  all	  powers	  not	  expressly	  delegated.”49	  Madison	  knew	  the	  Articles	  well;	  they	  gave	  the	  Confederation	  government	  no	  authority	  over	  domestic	  insurrection.	  	  After	  meeting	  with	  Bowdoin	  and	  Adams	  in	  Boston,	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Knox	  told	  Congress	  that	  an	  “armed	  tyranny”	  would	  be	  “established	  on	  the	  ruins	  of	  the	  present	  constitution	  ...	  unless	  the	  present	  commotions	  are	  checked	  with	  a	  strong	  hand.”	  Knox	  went	  on	  to	  recommend	  that	  up	  to	  800	  troops	  be	  raised	  and	  sent	  to	  Massachusetts	  to	  guard	  the	  federal	  arsenal	  at	  Springfield.50	  After	  reviewing	  the	  report,	  Congress	  decided	  to	  raise	  over	  1,300	  troops.	  To	  circumvent	  the	  lack	  of	  constitutional	  authority,	  it	  suggested	  that	  the	  troops	  be	  raised	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  quelling	  an	  Indian	  uprising	  on	  the	  frontier,	  and	  conveniently	  march	  them	  through	  Massachusetts	  en	  route.	  The	  committee’s	  report	  made	  no	  reference	  whatever	  to	  the	  settler	  rebellion.51	  In	  a	  secret	  congressional	  report,	  presented	  the	  following	  day,	  Congress	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  absolutely	  necessary	  that	  the	  central	  government	  put	  down	  the	  insurrection.	  “The	  aid	  of	  the	  federal	  government,”	  or	  a	  “body	  of	  troops	  ...	  immediately	  raised	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	  was	  simply	  “necessary	  to	  stop	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  insurgents.”	  If	  not,	  they	  would	  not	  only	  “subvert	  the	  government,	  and	  not	  only	  reduce	  that	  commonwealth	  [Massachusetts]	  to	  a	  state	  of	  anarchy	  and	  confusion,	  but	  probably	  involve	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  calamities	  of	  a	  civil	  war.”52	  The	  report	  further	  indicated	  that	  the	  insurrection	  should	  not	  be	  mentioned	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  sending	  troops.	  “The	  enlargement	  of	  the	  military	  force,“	  Madison	  observed	  in	  Congress,	  was	  “masked	  ...	  with	  an	  ostensible	  preparation	  against	  the	  Indians.“53	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Even	  if	  Congress	  could	  circumvent	  constitutional	  restrictions	  on	  action	  by	  raising	  a	  force	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  Indian	  hostilities,	  Congress’s	  efforts	  were	  ultimately	  frustrated	  by	  ideological	  and	  administrative	  shortcomings.	  As	  Madison	  pointed	  out,	  federal	  intervention	  seemed	  to	  contradict	  core	  principles	  of	  republican	  government.	  Similarly,	  Congress	  was	  unable	  to	  mobilize	  or	  raise	  the	  troops	  to	  suppress	  the	  rebels.	  Under	  the	  Articles,	  Congress	  had	  no	  independent	  fiscal	  powers	  of	  taxation	  and	  its	  attempts	  to	  request	  money	  from	  the	  states	  to	  raise	  a	  new	  army	  failed.54	  Without	  the	  requisitions,	  Congress	  dared	  not	  put	  “arms	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  men	  whose	  fidelity	  must	  in	  some	  degree	  depend	  on	  the	  faithful	  payment	  of	  their	  wages.”55	  Congress	  could	  not	  preserve	  domestic	  order.	  	  	  
II.	  	  	  Powering:	  Granting	  Authority	  The	  proliferation	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  internal	  revolts	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  American	  independence	  made	  issues	  of	  domestic	  security	  and	  order	  paramount	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  framers.	  Yet,	  as	  the	  example	  of	  Shays’	  Rebellion	  illustrates,	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  not	  act	  against	  these	  insurrections	  and	  uphold	  public	  authority	  with	  the	  powers	  given	  to	  it	  by	  the	  Confederation.	  “The	  U.S.	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  aid	  the	  government	  of	  particular	  states	  in	  distresses	  like	  these”	  but	  was	  without	  the	  authority,	  legitimacy	  and	  capacity	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  fact,	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  scarcely	  “maintain	  itself.”56	  James	  Wilson,	  who	  attended	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Pennsylvania	  Ratification	  Convention,	  also	  “lamented	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  Congress	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  extinguish,	  entirely,	  the	  spark	  which	  has	  kindled	  a	  dangerous	  flame”	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Union	  and	  from	  sources	  other	  than	  agrarian	  tax	  revolts.57	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In	  the	  mid-­‐1780s,	  the	  Federalist	  elite	  began	  discussing	  the	  need	  to	  build	  a	  new	  central	  power	  to	  overcome	  the	  internal	  disorders	  besetting	  the	  new	  nation	  and	  defeat	  domestic	  insurgency.58	  In	  November	  1786,	  George	  Washington	  suggested	  to	  James	  Madison	  that	  no	  “stronger	  evidence	  can	  be	  given	  of	  the	  want	  of	  energy	  in	  our	  government	  than	  these	  disorders”	  and	  a	  “power	  to	  check	  them”	  was	  essential.59	  Madison	  agreed	  that	  the	  Massachusetts	  regulation	  had	  “furnish[ed]	  new	  proofs	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  such	  a	  vigour	  in	  the	  General	  Government	  as	  will	  be	  able	  to	  restore	  health	  to	  any	  diseased	  part	  of	  the	  federal	  body.”60	  Similarly,	  Stephen	  Higginson	  wrote	  to	  Henry	  Knox	  that	  “the	  insurrection	  in	  this	  State	  [Massachusetts]”	  provided	  strong	  arguments	  for	  “an	  efficient	  Government	  for	  the	  Union”	  with	  “force	  enough”	  to	  suppress	  popular	  rebellions.61	  According	  to	  Virginia’s	  governor	  Edmund	  Randolph,	  the	  Confederation	  was	  deficient	  because	  “the	  Federal	  government	  could	  not	  check	  ...	  a	  rebellion	  in	  any	  [state]	  not	  having	  constitutional	  power	  nor	  means	  to	  interpose	  according	  to	  exigency.”62	  No	  “laws	  in	  the	  confederation	  authorize[d]	  Congress	  to	  intrude	  troops	  into	  a	  State”	  and	  could	  not	  “preserve	  the	  States	  against	  sedition.”63	  It	  was	  widely	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  create	  a	  power	  “to	  support	  the	  sovereignty	  and	  preserve	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  Union	  ...	  against	  domestic	  insurrections”	  of	  all	  sorts.64	  To	  “bring	  about	  such	  an	  amendment	  of	  the	  federal	  Constitution”	  nationally	  minded	  elites	  looked	  to	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  that	  was	  to	  be	  held	  in	  Philadelphia	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1787.65	  It	  was	  the	  “most	  favourable	  circumstances”	  for	  “prudent	  and	  sagacious	  men	  …	  to	  establish	  a	  more	  permanent	  and	  vigorous	  government”	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  unruly	  politics.66	  	  If	  the	  Federalists	  agreed	  that	  the	  central	  government	  should	  be	  endowed	  with	  power	  over	  domestic	  insurrection,	  they	  did	  not	  yet	  possess	  a	  constitutional	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blueprint	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  emergency	  powers.	  Between	  February	  and	  April	  1787,	  a	  leading	  Virginian,	  James	  Madison,	  designed	  one.	  Madison	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  problems	  Congress	  had	  encountered.67	  His	  writings	  suggest	  that	  he	  wanted	  clear	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  govern	  domestic	  violence.	  As	  he	  wrote	  to	  Edmund	  Randolph,	  “an	  article	  ought	  to	  be	  inserted	  [in	  the	  constitution]	  expressly	  guaranteeing	  the	  tranquility	  of	  the	  states	  against	  internal	  as	  well	  as	  external	  danger.”68	  Randolph	  agreed,	  arguing	  that	  the	  new	  constitution	  had	  to	  provide	  “a	  firm	  resort	  against	  domestic	  commotion”69	  and	  “secure	  against	  sedition.”70	  After	  a	  few	  months	  of	  reflection,	  Madison	  produced	  two	  memoranda	  analyzing	  the	  political	  problems	  that	  plagued	  the	  United	  States.	  These	  texts	  are	  famous,	  but	  the	  state	  security	  sections	  they	  contain	  are	  seldom	  scrutinized.	  In	  “Vices	  of	  the	  Political	  System	  of	  the	  U.S.,”	  Madison	  designated	  as	  the	  sixth	  “vice”	  a	  want	  of	  federal	  power	  to	  “guaranty	  to	  the	  states	  their	  Constitutions	  and	  laws	  against	  internal	  violence.”71	  In	  “Notes	  on	  Ancient	  and	  Modern	  Confederacies,”	  Madison	  reviewed	  how	  previous	  confederacies	  had	  dealt	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  domestic	  insurrection.	  He	  was	  most	  impressed	  with	  the	  history	  of	  Switzerland.	  “Among	  the	  Swiss	  cantons,”	  Madison	  noted	  “it	  is	  an	  essential	  object	  …	  to	  preserve	  interior	  tranquility	  by	  the	  reciprocal	  protection	  of	  the	  form	  of	  Governmt	  established	  in	  each	  Canton,	  so	  that	  each	  is	  armed	  with	  the	  force	  of	  the	  whole	  Corps	  for	  the	  suppression	  of	  rebellions	  and	  Revolts.”72	  The	  history	  of	  the	  Swiss	  confederation	  “informs	  us	  that	  mutual	  aid	  is	  frequently	  claimed	  and	  afforded.”73	  Similarly,	  Madison	  recorded	  that,	  for	  Montesquieu,	  a	  key	  advantage	  of	  “confederate	  republics”	  was	  that	  “should	  popular	  insurrection	  happen	  in	  one	  of	  the	  States,	  the	  others	  are	  able	  to	  quell	  it.”74	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Madison’s	  central	  proposition	  was	  to	  make	  the	  federal	  government	  responsible	  for	  “supporting	  the	  sovereignty	  and	  preserving	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  Union.”	  Drawing	  on	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Swiss	  confederacy	  and	  Montesquieu’s	  analysis,	  the	  proposal	  granted	  the	  central	  government	  the	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  collect	  the	  whole	  civil	  and	  military	  resources	  of	  the	  entire	  Union	  and	  direct	  it	  to	  “maintain	  the	  just	  authority	  of	  the	  laws	  against	  those	  violent	  invasions	  of	  them	  which	  amount	  to	  insurrections	  and	  rebellions.”75	  Madison	  was	  intent	  on	  creating	  a	  power	  against	  domestic	  insurrection	  as	  expansive	  and	  forceful	  as	  possible.	  It	  would	  provide	  as	  much	  “safety”	  to	  “constitutional	  authority”	  as	  was	  not	  only	  within	  the	  “compass	  of	  human	  probability”	  but	  also	  as	  within	  the	  “compass	  of	  human	  remedies.”	  If	  any	  constitutional	  system	  could	  provide	  “a	  cure”	  for	  domestic	  calamities	  of	  this	  sort,	  argued	  Madison,	  it	  was	  the	  new	  federal	  constitution.76	  Madison’s	  formulation	  was	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  Virginia	  plan,	  which	  Randolph	  presented	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1787.	  According	  to	  the	  proposal,	  responsibility	  for	  domestic	  insurrection	  had	  become	  a	  major	  object	  of	  the	  federal	  government.	  For	  Randolph,	  “the	  objects	  of	  the	  Union”	  were	  “to	  secure	  [the	  Union	  and	  individual	  states]	  1.	  Against	  foreign	  invasions:	  2.	  against	  dissentions	  between	  members	  of	  the	  Union	  or	  in	  particular	  states.”77	  Similarly,	  Roger	  Sherman,	  one	  of	  the	  plan’s	  strongest	  opponents,	  defined	  “the	  objects	  of	  the	  Union”	  as	  “1.	  Defence	  agst.	  foreign	  danger.	  2.	  agst	  internal	  disputes	  and	  a	  resort	  to	  force.”78	  The	  so-­‐called	  Pinckney	  plan	  drew	  fierce	  criticism	  because	  it	  did	  not	  make	  provisions	  for	  new	  federal	  powers	  to	  confront	  domestic	  violence.	  Randolph	  charged	  that	  the	  plan	  made	  “no	  provision	  agt.internal	  insurrection”	  or	  “for	  crushing	  rebellion	  whenever	  it	  may	  rear	  its	  crest”	  and	  did	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not	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  “the	  rebellion	  of	  Massachusetts.”79	  As	  he	  explained,	  “when	  the	  salvation	  of	  the	  Republic	  was	  at	  stake,	  it	  would	  be	  treason	  to	  our	  trust	  not	  to	  propose	  what	  we	  found	  necessary.”80	  Madison	  similarly	  denounced	  the	  Pinckney	  plan	  for	  not	  “securing	  the	  internal	  tranquility	  of	  the	  States.”	  It	  “contained	  no	  provisions	  for	  supplying	  the	  defect	  of	  the	  Confederation”	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  “the	  insurrection	  in	  Massts.”81	  	   In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  convention,	  the	  concern	  with	  quelling	  domestic	  insurrection	  crystallized	  in	  concrete	  clauses	  of	  the	  new	  Constitution.	  They	  were	  connected	  by	  a	  shared	  rationale	  and	  purpose	  of	  “emergency,”	  “safety,”	  “security,”	  “defense,”	  or	  “self-­‐preservation”	  of	  the	  “state”	  or	  “constitutional	  authority”	  against	  “insurrection,”	  “rebellion,”	  “sedition”	  or	  “domestic	  violence.”	  Their	  aim	  was	  to	  maintain	  “domestic	  tranquility,”	  “publick	  safety,”	  “a	  well-­‐regulated	  community,”	  and	  to	  “secure	  the	  state.”82	  Taken	  together,	  these	  provisions	  constitute	  what	  we	  could	  call	  the	  internal	  security	  or	  emergency	  clauses	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  central	  government	  was	  empowered	  to	  raise	  armies,	  to	  call	  forth	  the	  militia	  “to	  execute	  the	  Laws	  of	  the	  Union,	  suppress	  Insurrections,”	  and	  “guarantee	  to	  every	  State	  in	  this	  Union	  a	  Republican	  Form	  of	  Government,”	  and	  defend	  “against	  domestic	  violence.”	  It	  could	  suspend	  “the	  Privilege	  of	  the	  Writ	  of	  Habeas	  Corpus	  ...	  in	  Cases	  of	  Rebellion	  or	  Invasion”	  or	  when	  “the	  public	  Safety	  may	  require	  it.”	  It	  also	  provided	  a	  definition	  of	  treason	  against	  the	  United	  States	  and	  granted	  the	  President	  the	  power	  to	  offer	  pardons.	  Vesting	  the	  power	  in	  the	  executive,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  legislature,	  was	  deemed	  an	  important	  tool	  of	  managing	  rebellion.	  As	  Alexander	  Hamilton	  explained,	  “in	  seasons	  of	  insurrection	  or	  rebellion,	  there	  are	  often	  critical	  moments,	  when	  a	  well-­‐timed	  offer	  of	  pardon	  to	  the	  insurgents	  or	  rebels	  may	  restore	  the	  tranquility	  of	  the	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commonwealth.”83	  Finally,	  the	  determination	  to	  maintain	  public	  order	  through	  federal	  coercion	  pulsated	  in	  the	  Preamble	  as	  the	  people’s	  commitment	  to	  “insure	  domestic	  Tranquility,”	  a	  provision	  comprehending	  all	  “breaches	  of	  the	  peace,	  as	  well	  as	  against	  all	  public	  commotions	  or	  general	  insurrections.”84	  Many	  who	  supported	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Constitution	  were	  drawn	  to	  its	  security	  clauses.	  “The	  expediency	  of	  the	  plan	  of	  government,”	  wrote	  the	  editors	  of	  the	  Virginia	  Herald	  arose	  “from	  the	  provisions	  which	  they	  have	  so	  judiciously	  made	  for	  preventing	  insurrections	  …	  and	  for	  procuring	  obedience	  to	  the	  federal	  constitution.”85	  A	  Mr.	  Smith	  of	  Massachusetts,	  identifying	  himself	  as	  “a	  plain	  man	  …	  living	  by	  the	  plough	  …	  and	  not	  used	  to	  speak	  in	  publick,”	  spoke	  of	  his	  firsthand	  experience	  with	  the	  “anarchy”	  and	  “tyranny”	  of	  Shays’	  Rebellion.	  Knowing	  “good	  government	  by	  the	  want	  of	  it”	  he	  “saw	  this	  Constitution	  [and]	  found	  that	  it	  was	  a	  cure	  for	  these	  disorders.”86	  Edmund	  Pendleton	  considered	  the	  Constitution	  “admirably	  contrived	  to	  prevent	  Popular	  Tumults.”87	  For	  Pelatiah	  Webster	  there	  could	  be	  “no	  doubt	  that	  each	  State	  will	  receive	  from	  the	  union	  great	  support	  and	  
protection	  against	  the	  invasions	  and	  inroads	  of	  foreign	  enemies,	  as	  well	  as	  against	  
riots	  and	  insurrections	  of	  their	  own	  citizens;	  and	  of	  consequence,	  the	  course	  of	  their	  internal	  administration	  will	  be	  secured	  by	  this	  means	  against	  any	  
interruption	  or	  embarrassment	  from	  either	  of	  these	  causes.”88	  An	  Antifederalist	  delegate	  to	  the	  Pennsylvania	  Ratification	  Convention,	  by	  contrast,	  protested	  “because,	  from	  the	  power	  claimed	  by	  the	  new	  Constitution,	  Congress	  will	  have	  a	  right	  to	  suppress	  all	  “domestic	  insurrections”	  in	  particular	  states,	  by	  which	  means	  we	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	  the	  only	  means	  of	  opposing	  the	  laws	  of	  this	  state.”89	  For	  another	  the	  new	  powers	  threatened	  to	  deprive	  the	  people	  of	  their	  means	  of	  “waging	  war	  against	  tyrants.”90	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Madison’s	  system	  for	  domestic	  emergency	  is	  suggestive	  of	  how	  federal-­‐state	  relations	  are	  viewed.	  It	  highlights	  that	  the	  momentum	  of	  federal	  power	  did	  not	  necessarily	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  state	  power.	  Security	  of	  state	  and	  central	  governments	  was	  not,	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  between	  proponents	  of	  a	  strong	  national	  government	  and	  state’s	  rights.	  Rather,	  federal	  and	  state	  power	  could	  be	  mutually	  reinforcing;	  the	  one	  could	  add	  strength	  to	  the	  other.	  While	  many	  leading	  Federalists	  echoed	  this	  interpretation	  of	  the	  new	  coercive	  powers,	  no	  one	  articulated	  it	  clearer	  that	  Pelatiah	  Webster.	  For	  Webster,	  Madison’s	  system	  gave	  “an	  establishment,	  support,	  and	  protection	  to	  the	  internal	  and	  
separate	  police	  of	  each	  State	  …	  which	  it	  could	  not	  possibly	  enjoy	  in	  an	  independent	  state.”	  In	  this	  sense,	  creating	  new	  powers	  over	  rebellion	  would	  not	  only	  strengthen	  the	  federal	  government	  but	  also	  augment	  the	  “internal	  police	  and	  jurisdiction	  of	  each	  of	  the	  particular	  States.”91	  	  
III.	  	  	  Powering:	  Asserting	  Authority	  Shays’	  Rebellion	  not	  only	  made	  it	  painfully	  clear	  that	  Congress	  was	  devoid	  of	  constitutional	  authority	  but	  also	  that	  it	  lacked	  institutional	  capacity	  to	  organize	  and	  mobilize	  the	  physical	  force	  necessary	  to	  repress	  domestic	  rebellion.	  The	  Revolution	  had	  swept	  away	  virtually	  all	  crystallizations	  of	  a	  centralizing	  state,	  including	  the	  fiscal-­‐military	  domain	  that	  had	  come	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  controlling	  domestic	  resistance	  prior	  to	  the	  Revolution.	  The	  nascent	  American	  military	  establishment,	  engendered	  by	  the	  war,	  was	  similarly	  dismantled	  after	  hostilities	  ended.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  federal	  government	  possessed	  no	  institutional	  repositories	  of	  physical	  force	  responsive	  to,	  and	  at	  the	  disposal	  of,	  state	  officials.	  The	  institutions	  that	  did	  persist	  were	  principally	  composed	  of	  local,	  socially	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embedded	  and	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  government—including	  household,	  town,	  county	  and	  militia—highly	  responsive	  to	  popular	  will.	  With	  coercive	  force	  dispersed	  and	  responsive	  to	  local	  will,	  the	  coercive	  institutional	  capacity	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  authorities	  to	  act	  against	  local	  communities	  or	  groups	  was	  negligible.92	  Furthermore,	  the	  federal	  government	  had	  no	  independent	  means	  of	  recruiting	  and	  supplying	  a	  new	  army	  or	  laying	  taxes	  and	  borrowing	  the	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  it.	  Under	  the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation,	  Congress	  could	  not	  act	  independently	  of	  the	  states	  and	  depended	  on	  their	  cooperation	  to	  raise	  and	  fund	  armies.93	  When	  such	  cooperation	  was	  not	  forthcoming,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Shays’	  Rebellion,	  the	  national	  government	  was	  impotent	  to	  act.	  The	  pretext	  of	  Indian	  war	  on	  the	  western	  frontier	  might,	  albeit	  imperfectly,	  circumvent	  the	  lack	  of	  constitutional	  authority,	  but	  the	  problem	  of	  institutional	  capacity	  reduced	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  a	  passive	  spectator	  as	  Shays’	  Rebellion	  raged	  throughout	  Massachusetts.	  As	  the	  Federalists	  explained,	  constitutional	  authority	  over	  domestic	  rebellion	  would	  be	  “pageantry	  alone,	  without	  an	  adequate	  supply	  of	  men	  and	  money.”94	  Institutional	  capacity	  to	  assert	  state	  and	  federal	  authority	  was	  the	  “natural	  incident	  to	  the	  duties	  of	  superintending	  the	  common	  defense,	  and	  watching	  over	  the	  internal	  peace	  of	  the	  Confederacy.”95	  Through	  the	  process	  of	  framing	  and	  ratifying	  the	  new	  constitution,	  the	  Federalists	  attempted	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  forcibly	  asserting	  the	  new	  authority	  over	  popular	  rebellion.	  The	  Federalist	  argument	  suggests	  that	  American	  sovereignty	  was	  raised	  on	  a	  bedrock	  of	  coercion.	  Because	  they	  were	  motivated	  by	  a	  common	  fear	  of	  rebellion	  against	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  law,	  the	  Federalist	  point	  of	  departure	  was	  the	  indivisibility	  of	  coercion	  and	  sovereignty.	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The	  Federalists	  argued	  that	  force	  and	  obedience	  were	  integral	  to	  sovereignty.	  “No	  government,”	  claimed	  Randolph,	  could	  be	  “stable,	  which	  hangs	  on	  human	  inclination	  alone,	  unbiased	  by	  the	  coercion.”	  “Coercion”	  was	  “an	  indispensable	  ingredient”	  to	  a	  properly	  constituted	  sovereignty.96	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  argued,	  “the	  very	  term,	  government,	  implies	  a	  supreme,	  controuling	  power	  somewhere;	  a	  power	  to	  coerce,	  whenever	  coercion	  shall	  be	  necessary.”97	  In	  cases	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  law,	  the	  federal	  government	  had	  “a	  right”	  to	  “exact	  obedience,	  or	  punish	  disobedience”	  by	  “force.”98	  “The	  public	  force	  must	  be	  used,”	  Madison	  explained,	  “when	  resistance	  to	  the	  laws	  required	  it,	  otherwise	  society	  must	  be	  destroyed.”99	  To	  meet	  the	  actual	  institutional	  imperatives	  of	  organizing	  “the	  use	  of	  physical	  force”	  to	  uphold	  the	  law	  against	  insurrection,	  Federalist	  state	  makers	  drew	  on	  instruments	  then	  available	  to	  fiscal-­‐military	  states.100	  The	  Federalists	  argued	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  had	  to	  possess	  the	  unlimited	  power	  of	  military	  mobilization	  not	  only	  to	  defend	  the	  union	  against	  external	  attacks	  but	  also	  against	  domestic	  challenges.	  Randolph	  captured	  the	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Virginia	  debates	  when	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  must	  have	  the	  power	  to	  “raise	  an	  army	  to	  protect	  her	  citizens	  from	  internal	  seditions	  and	  external	  attacks.”101	  In	  The	  Federalist	  23	  through	  28,	  Hamilton,	  similarly,	  insisted	  on	  the	  need	  for	  unlimited	  power	  to	  “raise	  armies”	  to	  preserve	  “the	  public	  peace	  as	  well	  against	  internal	  convulsions	  as	  external	  attacks.”102	  The	  recent	  “spirit	  of	  revolt”	  instructed	  the	  American	  people	  that	  troops	  and	  “military	  force	  in	  time	  of	  peace	  [was]	  essential	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  society.”103	  James	  Wilson	  was	  even	  more	  explicit.	  After	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  crisis	  brought	  to	  Massachusetts	  by	  Shays’	  Rebellion,	  Wilson	  claimed	  that	  the	  “power	  of	  raising	  and	  keeping	  up	  standing	  armies,	  in	  time	  of	  peace,	  is	  essential	  to	  every	  government	  ...	  no	  government	  can	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secure	  its	  citizens	  against	  dangers,	  internal	  and	  external,	  without	  possessing	  it	  and	  sometimes	  carrying	  it	  into	  execution.”104	  According	  to	  Madison,	  “resistance	  ...	  made	  to	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  laws	  ...	  ought	  to	  be	  overcome”	  and	  if	  need	  be	  it	  by	  “regular	  forces”	  or	  a	  “standing	  army.”105	  	  The	  Constitution	  also	  granted	  the	  federal	  government	  a	  general	  and	  expansive	  power	  to	  tax	  the	  American	  people	  independent	  of	  the	  states,	  together	  with	  the	  power	  to	  “borrow	  money	  on	  the	  credit	  of	  the	  United	  States.”	  Alexander	  Hamilton	  articulated	  the	  necessity	  of	  an	  unlimited	  federal	  power	  over	  taxation	  and	  borrowing	  in	  connection	  with	  domestic	  rebellion.	  According	  to	  Hamilton,	  the	  “chief	  sources	  of	  expense	  in	  every	  government”	  were	  “wars	  and	  rebellions;	  the	  support	  of	  those	  institutions	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  guard	  the	  body	  politic	  against	  these	  two	  most	  mortal	  diseases	  of	  society.”	  Revenue	  was	  “the	  essential	  engine	  by	  which	  the	  means	  of	  answering	  the	  national	  exigencies	  must	  be	  procured”	  and	  “the	  power	  of	  procuring	  that	  article	  in	  its	  full	  extent	  must	  necessarily	  be	  comprehended	  in	  that	  of	  providing	  for	  those	  exigencies.”	  But	  recent	  experience	  had	  “taught”	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  states	  for	  revenue,	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  national	  danger	  when	  public	  safety	  demanded	  it.	  The	  “national	  defense”	  against	  “foreign	  war	  and	  domestic	  convulsions”	  thus	  necessitated	  an	  unlimited	  federal	  power	  to	  lay	  taxes	  and	  borrow	  money.	  “A	  government	  half	  supplied	  and	  always	  necessitous”	  could	  not	  “fulfill	  the	  purposes	  of	  its	  institution”	  to	  “provide	  for	  the	  security	  ...	  of	  the	  commonwealth.”106	  	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Federalists	  saw	  the	  military	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  domestic	  policy,	  they	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  mobilize	  a	  professional	  army	  to	  handle	  routine	  policing	  or	  even	  suppress	  all	  cases	  of	  resistance.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	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suggested	  that	  the	  mobilization	  of	  physical	  force	  would	  be	  based	  on	  a	  spectrum	  of	  threat.	  As	  Hamilton	  explained	  “the	  means	  to	  be	  employed	  [“in	  case	  of	  sedition	  or	  insurrection”]	  must	  be	  proportioned	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  mischief.”	  “A	  slight	  commotion	  in	  a	  small	  part	  of	  a	  State”	  could	  most	  likely	  be	  put	  down	  by	  “the	  militia	  of	  the	  residue.”	  But	  if	  “the	  insurrection	  should	  pervade	  a	  whole	  State,	  or	  a	  principle	  part	  of	  it,”	  it	  would	  be	  “necessary	  to	  raise	  troops	  for	  repressing	  the	  disorder.”	  The	  local	  militia	  was	  the	  first,	  and	  preferred,	  resort.	  But	  in	  cases	  of	  larger,	  more	  exceptional,	  insurrections	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  “raise	  and	  maintain	  a	  more	  regular	  force.”107	  	  
IV.	  	  	  Powering:	  Legitimizing	  Authority	  The	  creation	  of	  emergency	  powers	  for	  the	  security	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  governments	  required	  Madison	  and	  the	  Federalists	  to	  contend	  with	  ideological	  problems	  of	  legitimation.	  Revolutionary-­‐era	  Americans	  drew	  upon	  a	  wealth	  of	  ideological	  traditions.	  But	  within	  the	  political	  realm,	  republicanism	  was	  an	  influential	  paradigm,	  and	  it	  dominated	  elite	  and	  popular	  attitudes	  on	  issues	  of	  armed	  force,	  public	  order,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  social	  power.108	  James	  Madison	  and	  his	  Federalist	  allies	  were	  hard	  pressed	  to	  make	  consonant	  the	  deployment	  of	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  with	  the	  republican	  tradition.109	  As	  scholars	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  have	  long	  noted,	  political	  power	  must	  always	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  wider	  social	  and	  political	  beliefs;	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  condition	  for	  governing	  and	  integral	  to	  the	  effective	  exercise	  of	  state	  power.110	  Indeed,	  Max	  Weber’s	  influential	  definition	  of	  the	  state	  distinguished	  it	  from	  other	  societal	  institutions	  as	  holding	  a	  monopoly,	  not	  on	  violence	  per	  se,	  but	  on	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  force.	  For	  Madison	  and	  the	  Federalists,	  legitimacy	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  unambiguous	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obstacle	  facing	  the	  creation	  of	  federal	  emergency	  powers.	  As	  Madison	  observed	  in	  Congress	  at	  the	  height	  of	  Shays’	  Rebellion,	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  seemed	  to	  contradict	  republican	  theory.	  Furthermore,	  the	  new	  powers	  could	  only	  be	  secured	  through	  popular	  consent,	  by	  persuading	  the	  American	  public	  of	  the	  necessity	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  proposed	  measures,	  a	  legitimacy	  that	  had	  to	  be	  secured	  through	  the	  “great	  national	  discussion”	  over	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  new	  constitution.111	  The	  Federalists,	  then,	  had	  to	  act	  creatively	  to	  reconcile	  the	  creation	  of	  federal	  force	  to	  coerce	  right-­‐bearing	  citizens	  with	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  people.	  The	  experience	  of	  popular	  insurrection	  throughout	  the	  1780s	  did	  not	  accord	  with	  republican	  principles.	  According	  to	  the	  classical	  tradition,	  popular	  rebellion	  was	  the	  natural	  offspring	  of	  monarchical	  governments.	  Republican	  principles,	  by	  contrast,	  rendered	  insurrection	  illegitimate	  as	  well	  as	  irrelevant.	  As	  the	  former	  colonies	  transitioned	  into	  a	  republic,	  popular	  insurrection	  should,	  therefore,	  have	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  republican	  governments	  were	  based	  on	  popular	  representation	  and	  majority	  rule.	  They	  were,	  by	  definition,	  governments	  of	  the	  people	  themselves,	  or	  based	  on	  the	  will	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  community.	  In	  republics,	  only	  disgruntled	  minorities	  would	  mount	  rebellions.	  And	  they	  had	  no	  right	  to	  oppose	  the	  legitimate	  will	  of	  the	  people.112	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  politics	  of	  a	  republic	  should	  have	  rendered	  insurrection	  obsolete.	  According	  to	  the	  classical	  tradition,	  public	  order	  in	  republics	  was	  underpinned	  by	  a	  principle,	  which	  held	  that	  “right	  and	  might,”	  or	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  armed	  force,	  were	  conjoined.	  It	  meant	  that	  the	  sword	  and	  sovereignty	  were	  on	  the	  same	  side:	  both	  lay	  with	  the	  people.	  It	  was	  an	  important	  principle	  for	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  republics,	  which	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	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power	  flowed	  from	  the	  great	  body	  of	  the	  people	  and	  that	  republican	  governments	  were	  dependent	  on	  them.	  Underlying	  it	  was	  the	  classical	  idea	  of	  the	  Greco-­‐Roman	  polis	  or	  comitia	  centuriata,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  popular	  assemblies	  were	  at	  once	  civic	  assemblies	  of	  the	  electorate	  and	  musters	  of	  the	  militia.	  The	  electorate	  consisted	  of	  those	  who	  bore	  arms	  and	  participation	  in	  elections	  was	  coextensive	  with	  participation	  in	  the	  militia—both	  were	  the	  domains	  of	  adult	  white	  men.	  The	  citizenry	  cast	  their	  votes	  not	  just	  through	  the	  ballot	  but	  also	  by	  participating	  in	  military	  musters,	  enforcing	  laws,	  and	  quelling	  insurrections.	  Since	  Republics	  spurned	  standing	  armies,	  the	  citizens	  constituting	  the	  majority	  of	  votes	  also	  comprised	  the	  majority	  of	  armed	  force	  and	  the	  government’s	  main	  source	  of	  military	  power.	  Hence,	  any	  given	  government	  was	  supported	  by,	  and	  dependent	  on,	  the	  majority	  of	  votes	  as	  well	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  arms.113	  The	  majority	  would	  always	  prevail	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	  came	  down	  to	  a	  vote	  or	  an	  armed	  fight.	  Insurrections	  would	  not	  wreak	  havoc	  or	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  public	  security	  any	  more	  than	  a	  minority	  of	  votes	  could	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  election.	  As	  James	  Madison	  put	  it,	  in	  republics,	  majorities	  would	  not	  have	  a	  reason	  (and	  if	  they	  did,	  they	  would	  have	  a	  perfect	  right)	  and	  minorities	  would	  never	  have	  the	  actual	  armed	  force	  to	  amount	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  government.114	  Investing	  the	  central	  government	  with	  formidable	  internal	  emergency	  powers	  deviated	  further	  still	  from	  republican	  theory.	  It	  created	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  organized	  and	  armed	  force	  for	  the	  security	  and	  support	  of	  established	  governments	  against	  their	  own	  citizens.	  This	  power	  did	  not	  issue	  from	  the	  people,	  or	  the	  electorate-­‐militia,	  as	  prescribed	  by	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might.	  Rather,	  it	  flowed	  from	  a	  centralizing	  power	  external	  to	  the	  state	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and	  federal	  polities	  and	  independent	  of	  popular	  will	  and	  popular	  force	  within	  each	  state.115	  As	  the	  Antifederalists—opponents	  of	  the	  Constitution—argued,	  the	  federal	  government	  would	  only	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  support	  state	  minority	  governments	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  suppress	  the	  majority.	  If	  state	  governments	  sought	  federal	  support	  to	  put	  down	  insurrections,	  majorities	  or	  large	  minorities	  in	  those	  states	  had	  obviously	  come	  to	  oppose	  state	  governments.116	  By	  imbuing	  established	  governments	  with	  extraordinary	  force,	  external	  to	  the	  states	  and	  independent	  of	  the	  people,	  it	  upset	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  people.	  It	  strengthened	  rulers	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  ruled.	  If	  state	  governments	  were	  supported	  and	  maintained	  by	  an	  external	  armed	  force,	  they	  were	  much	  less	  dependent	  on	  the	  people	  for	  their	  survival	  and	  suppression	  of	  insurrections.117	  With	  the	  sword	  on	  the	  side	  of	  established	  governments,	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  adequately	  rooted	  in	  their	  might.	  The	  new	  federal	  security	  powers,	  thus,	  posed	  serious	  problems	  for	  republican	  ideology	  and	  the	  new	  republican	  governments,	  threatening	  their	  most	  sacred	  claim	  to	  be	  popular	  governments,	  dependent	  on	  the	  people.	  The	  conservative	  Baron	  von	  Steuben	  shrewdly	  picked	  up	  on	  this	  point.	  He	  argued	  that	  republicanism	  was	  threatened	  by	  federal	  intervention	  to	  suppress	  a	  rebellion	  within	  a	  state.	  He	  asked	  “if	  however	  the	  numerous	  militia	  should	  coincide	  in	  sentiment	  with	  the	  malcontents,	  and	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  respectable	  gentlemen	  only	  should	  be	  interested	  in	  keeping	  up	  the	  present	  system	  of	  administration,	  would	  Congress	  dare	  support	  such	  an	  abominable	  oligarchy?”118	  That	  was	  precisely	  what	  the	  new	  central	  powers	  threatened	  to	  do,	  von	  Steuben	  concluded.	  The	  new	  central	  powers	  of	  coercion	  threatened	  to	  upset	  the	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distribution	  of	  power	  between	  citizens	  and	  their	  governments	  and	  destroy	  a	  constitutive	  element	  of	  republican	  thought.	  Republicanism,	  then,	  faced	  a	  challenge	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  design	  of	  institutions	  to	  secure	  the	  state.	  For	  James	  Madison,	  the	  republican	  tradition	  unrevised	  could	  not	  grapple	  successfully	  with	  the	  issues	  arising	  from	  public	  disorder.	  If	  the	  new	  central	  powers	  of	  coercion	  were	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  republican	  principles,	  conceptual	  innovation	  was	  required.	  As	  the	  Confederation	  Congress	  sought	  ways	  to	  deal	  with	  Shays’	  Rebellion,	  Madison	  began	  devising	  a	  plan	  for	  legitimizing	  federal	  imposition.	  Madison	  was	  troubled	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  “difficult	  to	  reconcile	  an	  interference	  of	  Congs.	  in	  the	  internal	  controversies	  of	  a	  State	  …	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  Republican	  Govts.	  which	  as	  they	  rest	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  majority,	  necessarily	  suppose	  power	  and	  right	  to	  be	  on	  the	  same	  side.”119	  In	  subsequent	  months,	  however,	  Madison	  discarded	  this	  proposition	  and	  found	  a	  way	  to	  legitimize	  federal	  intervention.	  In	  so	  doing,	  Madison	  set	  aside	  a	  feature	  that	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  classical	  tradition,	  the	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might.	  	  Madison’s	  new	  thinking	  constitutes	  an	  important	  intervention	  into	  the	  nature	  and	  meaning	  of	  republicanism.	  It	  is,	  however,	  absent	  in	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  due	  to	  its	  preoccupation	  with	  Madison’s	  writings	  on	  legislative	  tyranny	  and	  its	  limitation	  in	  Federalist	  papers	  10	  and	  51.120	  But	  as	  Madison	  himself	  argued,	  the	  Constitution	  was	  not	  only	  concerned	  with	  restraining	  legislative	  tyranny	  or	  “oblig[ing]	  government	  to	  controul	  itself.”	  It	  was	  also	  concerned	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  state	  power	  or	  “enabl[ing]	  the	  government	  to	  controul	  the	  governed.”121	  By	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  issues	  of	  Federalist	  10—of	  legislative	  tyranny,	  representation	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  political	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sphere—it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  and	  illuminate	  Madison’s	  ideological	  innovation	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  domestic	  disorder	  and	  federal	  emergency	  powers,	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  empower	  and	  fortify	  established	  governments	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  own	  citizens.	  	  	   The	  experience	  of	  ancient	  and	  modern	  confederations	  was	  silent	  on	  how	  to	  legitimize	  coercive	  state	  power	  in	  a	  polity	  grounded	  on	  popular	  sovereignty.	  To	  create	  such	  a	  legitimation,	  Madison	  addressed	  himself	  to	  the	  core	  tenet	  of	  “republican	  theory,”	  which	  held	  that	  republican	  governments	  should	  combine	  “right	  and	  might.”	  Madison	  explained	  that	  “according	  to	  Republican	  Theory,	  Right	  and	  power	  being	  both	  vested	  in	  the	  majority,	  are	  held	  to	  be	  synonimous.”122	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  “seem[ed]	  not	  to	  square	  with	  the	  republican	  theory,	  to	  suppose,	  either	  that	  a	  majority	  have	  not	  the	  right,	  or	  that	  a	  minority	  will	  have	  the	  force,	  to	  subvert	  a	  government.”	  If	  the	  majority	  had	  the	  right	  and	  the	  minority	  not	  the	  force,	  rebellion	  should	  not	  be	  a	  serious	  problem	  of	  governance	  in	  republican	  polities	  and,	  consequently,	  “the	  federal	  interposition	  can	  never	  be	  required,	  but	  when	  it	  would	  be	  improper”	  in	  support	  of	  a	  minority	  faction.123	  	   “Theoretic	  reasoning,”	  however,	  had	  to	  be	  “qualified	  by	  the	  lessons	  of	  practice.”	  In	  fact,	  “a	  recent	  and	  well-­‐known	  event	  among	  ourselves	  has	  warned	  us	  to	  be	  prepared	  for	  emergencies	  of	  a	  like	  nature.”	  Madison	  aimed	  to	  reevaluate	  whether	  “it	  [is]	  true	  that	  force	  and	  right	  are	  necessarily	  on	  the	  same	  side	  in	  republican	  governments.”	  He	  argued	  that	  they	  were	  not,	  suggesting	  that	  might,	  or	  physical	  force,	  could	  easily	  become	  divorced	  from	  right,	  or	  legitimacy,	  even	  in	  republican	  polities.	  Lessons	  of	  practice	  suggested	  that	  “in	  a	  trial	  of	  actual	  force,	  victory	  [would	  not]	  be	  calculated	  by	  the	  rules	  which	  prevail	  in	  a	  census	  of	  the	  
	   33	  
inhabitants,	  or	  which	  determine	  the	  event	  of	  an	  election.”	  The	  republican	  unity	  of	  right	  and	  might	  threatened	  to	  render	  federal	  powers	  illegitimate.	  But	  by	  driving	  a	  wedge	  between	  right	  and	  might,	  Madison	  carved	  out	  a	  sphere	  for	  legitimate	  federal	  action.124	  	  	  	   Madison	  employed	  two	  levers	  to	  pry	  apart	  the	  unity	  of	  right	  and	  might:	  minority	  and	  majority	  violence.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  “according	  to	  fact	  and	  experience	  a	  minority	  may	  in	  an	  appeal	  to	  force,	  be	  an	  overmatch	  for	  the	  majority.”	  Madison	  discerned	  three	  eventualities	  in	  which	  the	  minority	  could	  overbear	  the	  majority.	  First,	  a	  “minor	  party”	  could	  possess	  a	  “superiority	  of	  pecuniary	  resources	  and	  military	  talents	  and	  experience,	  or	  …	  secret	  succors	  from	  foreign	  powers,	  as	  will	  render	  it	  superior	  in	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  sword.”	  Similarly,	  “a	  more	  compact	  and	  advantageous	  position”	  could	  easily	  “turn	  the	  scale	  on	  the	  same	  side,	  against	  a	  superior	  number	  so	  situated	  as	  to	  be	  less	  capable	  of	  a	  prompt	  and	  collected	  exertion	  of	  its	  strength.”	  Secondly,	  a	  “minority	  of	  citizens”	  could	  become	  “a	  majority	  of	  persons	  by	  the	  accession	  of	  alien	  residents,	  of	  casual	  concourse	  of	  adventurers,	  or	  of	  those	  whom	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  State	  has	  not	  admitted	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  suffrage.”	  These	  would	  “be	  more	  likely	  to	  join	  the	  standard	  of	  sedition	  than	  that	  of	  the	  established	  Government.”	  Thirdly,	  slavery	  rendered	  “republican	  Theory	  still	  more	  fallacious.”	  “During	  the	  calm	  of	  regular	  government”	  slaves	  may	  have	  “sunk	  below	  the	  level	  of	  men.”	  But	  “in	  the	  tempestuous	  scenes	  of	  civil	  violence”	  they	  would	  “emerge	  into	  the	  human	  character,	  and	  give	  a	  superiority	  of	  strength	  to	  any	  party	  with	  which	  they	  may	  associate	  themselves.”125	  The	  presence	  of	  slavery	  thus	  made	  white	  Americans	  less	  free.	  	   Majority	  violence	  also	  presented	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  republican	  coupling	  of	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right	  and	  might.	  Here	  Madison	  went	  even	  further.	  He	  argued	  that	  “a	  majority	  of	  a	  state”	  could	  also	  constitute	  an	  “illicit	  combination”	  for	  “purposes	  of	  violence”	  and	  to	  “subvert	  the	  government.”	  “Majority	  will”	  could	  easily	  become	  divorced	  from	  “Constitutional	  right,”	  and,	  in	  such	  cases,	  the	  former	  was	  ultimately	  in	  the	  wrong.	  Even	  “an	  insurrection	  pervading	  all	  the	  States”	  should	  be	  suppressed.	  No	  “majority	  should	  be	  left	  to	  maintain	  their	  cause	  by	  a	  bloody	  and	  obstinate	  contest.”126	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  majority	  of	  citizens	  within	  a	  state	  could	  pose	  an	  illegitimate	  threat	  to	  its	  security	  if	  it	  opposed	  the	  state	  outside	  the	  confines	  of	  constitutional	  procedure.	  In	  the	  end,	  Madison	  concluded	  that	  the	  new	  republic	  faced	  a	  serious	  conundrum:	  the	  notion	  that	  legitimacy	  and	  armed	  force—right	  and	  might—were	  conjoined	  had	  become	  “chimerical.”127	  	  	   By	  deconstructing	  the	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might,	  Madison	  argued	  that	  classical	  prescriptions	  could	  not	  underpin	  public	  order	  in	  the	  new	  republic.	  The	  principle	  held	  that	  both	  physical	  force	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  issued	  from	  the	  great	  body	  of	  the	  people	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  that	  internal	  insurrection	  could	  not	  become	  a	  problem.	  Minorities	  would	  never	  have	  the	  force,	  and	  majorities	  would	  have	  a	  perfect	  right,	  to	  subvert	  established	  governments.	  Madison,	  however,	  argued	  that	  experience	  contradicted	  republican	  theory	  and,	  in	  practice,	  the	  relationship	  between	  right	  and	  might	  had	  broken	  down.	  He	  found	  that	  minorities	  did	  possess	  the	  actual	  force,	  and	  that	  majorities	  did	  not	  have	  a	  legitimate	  right,	  to	  threaten	  the	  security	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  governments.	  But	  if	  the	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might	  no	  longer	  applied,	  what	  was	  the	  meaning	  of	  republican	  government?	  Madison’s	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  republicanism	  had	  been	  transformed	  into	  constitutional	  rule	  or	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  “Constitutional	  right”	  could	  easily	  become	  divorced	  from	  “majority	  will,”	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and,	  in	  such	  an	  event,	  ultimate	  legitimacy	  resided	  with	  the	  constitution.128	  Certainly,	  there	  “could	  be	  no	  impediment	  to	  reforms	  of	  the	  State	  constitutions	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  in	  a	  legal	  and	  peaceable	  mode.”129	  But	  if	  majorities,	  as	  well	  as	  minorities,	  rebelled	  against	  established	  governments,	  “the	  federal	  authority”	  ought	  to	  intervene	  and	  “protect	  the	  State	  constitutions”	  and	  “the	  federal	  Constitution.”130	  The	  federal	  government	  would	  prevent,	  by	  force,	  “changes	  affected	  by	  violence”	  by	  majorities	  and	  minorities	  alike.	  On	  it	  depended	  “the	  peace	  of	  society	  and	  stability	  of	  government.”131	  Madison	  thus	  replaced	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might	  with	  the	  fundamental	  tenets	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism—namely,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  constitutional	  government,	  and	  protection	  of	  rights.	  	   Madison’s	  legitimation	  was	  a	  significant	  intervention	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  republicanism.	  Disillusioned	  by	  limits	  of	  the	  classical	  tradition	  for	  the	  issues	  of	  public	  disorder,	  Madison	  transformed	  republicanism	  to	  save	  the	  republic.	  Madison	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  by	  replacing	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might	  with	  constitutional	  liberalism.	  Federal	  imposition	  in	  times	  of	  insurrection	  would	  be	  wrong	  if	  greater	  armed	  force	  as	  well	  as	  political	  legitimacy	  resided	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  people.	  The	  minority	  would	  not	  have	  the	  force,	  and	  the	  majority	  would	  have	  a	  perfect	  right,	  to	  subvert	  the	  constitutional	  order.	  But	  Madison	  argued	  that,	  in	  practice,	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might	  had	  failed	  to	  underpin	  public	  order.	  By	  replacing	  classical	  propositions	  with	  new	  liberal	  ones,	  Madison	  made	  legitimate	  the	  expansion	  of	  federal	  power	  in	  times	  of	  internal	  crisis.	  For	  granting	  the	  federal	  government	  emergency	  powers	  repaired	  the	  broken	  relationship	  of	  right	  and	  might	  and	  brought	  armed	  force	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  together	  anew	  in	  the	  liberal	  constitution.132	  In	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searching	  for	  a	  way	  to	  hold	  together	  the	  new	  American	  republic	  under	  the	  post-­‐revolutionary	  challenges	  of	  the	  1780s,	  Madison	  transformed	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might	  into	  a	  liberal	  one.	  This	  analysis	  of	  Madison’s	  effort	  to	  frame	  and	  legitimize	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  has	  significant	  consequences	  for	  understanding	  the	  rise	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism	  in	  the	  new	  United	  States.	  This	  essay	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  two	  were	  mutually	  constitutive.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  were	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  new	  liberal	  state.	  The	  former	  aimed	  to	  secure,	  sustain,	  and	  uphold	  state	  and	  federal	  governments	  against	  domestic	  defiance.	  And	  they	  imposed	  legible	  institutional	  and	  legal	  limitations	  on	  popular	  and	  unruly	  political	  activity,	  encaging	  it	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  liberal	  constitution.	  On	  the	  other,	  constitutional	  liberalism	  underpinned	  Madison’s	  attempt	  to	  endow	  the	  federal	  government	  with	  special	  emergency	  powers.	  By	  overcoming	  classical	  objections	  and	  carving	  out	  a	  sphere	  for	  federal	  power,	  constitutional	  liberalism	  engineered	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  strengthened	  it	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  own	  citizens.	  This	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  federal	  emergency	  powers—and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  more	  broadly—was	  not	  necessarily	  inconsistent	  with	  America’s	  liberal	  characteristics.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  the	  federal	  emergency	  powers	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  American	  liberal	  state	  were	  joined	  at	  the	  hip.	  	  
V.	  	  	  Conclusion:	  Madison’s	  Conceptual	  Transformation	  The	  domestic	  insecurity	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  governments	  propelled	  the	  creation	  of	  special	  emergency	  powers	  during	  the	  framing	  and	  adoption	  of	  the	  Federal	  Constitution.	  Constitutionally,	  Madison	  looked	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  other	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confederacies	  to	  devise	  a	  federal	  constitutional	  system	  for	  the	  suppression	  of	  internal	  disorders.	  Institutionally,	  the	  Federalists	  granted	  the	  federal	  government	  unqualified	  power	  to	  recruit	  and	  maintain	  armies,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  expansive	  power	  to	  tax	  and	  borrow	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  them,	  to	  give	  the	  new	  federal	  powers	  effect.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  this	  process	  was	  Madison’s	  effort	  to	  rationalize	  and	  justify	  the	  new	  powers	  and	  square	  them	  with	  the	  political	  ideals	  of	  the	  new	  republic.	  Republican	  ideology	  raised	  serious	  objections	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  federal	  emergency	  powers.	  The	  provisions	  violated	  the	  core	  principle	  that,	  in	  republics,	  right	  and	  might	  must	  issue	  from	  the	  great	  body	  of	  the	  people.	  It	  was	  an	  important	  principle	  for	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  republican	  polities,	  which	  ensured	  that	  the	  power	  flowed	  from	  the	  people	  themselves.	  For	  Madison,	  however,	  experience	  showed	  that	  this	  principle	  had	  become	  highly	  unrealistic.	  He	  argued	  that	  minorities	  could	  possess	  force,	  and	  that	  majorities	  did	  not	  have	  a	  right	  to	  threaten	  the	  security	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  governments.	  The	  internal	  security	  of	  American	  governments	  demanded	  that	  this	  popular	  axiom	  be	  discarded	  and	  federal	  power	  expanded.	  Madison	  created	  a	  new	  sphere	  for	  federal	  powers	  by	  replacing	  the	  republican	  principle	  of	  right	  and	  might	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism.	  Madison’s	  ideological	  transformation	  was	  not	  complete	  in	  1789.	  Subsequent	  generations	  of	  Americans	  have	  continued	  to	  debate	  their	  right	  to	  revolution.	  Yet	  the	  constitutional	  dispensation	  of	  1787	  furnished	  the	  federal	  government	  with	  the	  legitimate	  means	  to	  overcome	  the	  resistance	  of	  both	  majorities	  and	  minorities	  of	  its	  own	  citizens.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  principles	  of	  constitutional	  liberalism	  fueled	  that	  expansion	  of	  federal	  power.	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  1	  Sveinn	  Jóhannesson	  is	  a	  PhD	  Candidate	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Cambridge.	  
For	  invaluable	  encouragement	  and	  critical	  readings	  of	  this	  essay,	  I	  am	  very	  
grateful	  to	  Ira	  Katznelson,	  Valur	  Ingimundarson,	  and,	  above	  all,	  Gary	  Gerstle.	  
Many	  thanks	  also	  to	  Fernanda	  Bretones,	  Mary	  Bridges,	  Henry	  Gorman,	  Juliet	  
Larkin-­‐Gilmore,	  Kathryn	  Olivarius,	  and	  Samira	  Sheikh.	  Finally,	  I	  wish	  to	  
thank	  the	  editors	  and	  anonymous	  readers	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  for	  
constructive	  suggestions	  and	  insights,	  from	  which	  this	  essay	  benefited	  greatly.	  
Readers	  may	  contact	  Jóhannesson	  at	  smj55@cam.ac.uk.	  
2	  For	  Shays’	  Rebellion	  see	  David-­‐P.	  Szatmary,	  Shays’	  Rebellion:	  The	  Making	  of	  an	  
Agrarian	  Insurrection	  (Amherst,	  1984);	  Leonard	  L.	  Richards,	  Shays’s	  Rebellion:	  
The	  American	  Revolution’s	  Final	  Battle	  (Philadelphia,	  2002);	  Woody-­‐Holton,-­‐
Unruly-­‐Americans-­‐and-­‐the-­‐Origins-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Constitution	  (New	  York,	  2007);	  George	  
Minot,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Insurrections	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  the	  Year	  1786	  and	  the	  
Rebellion	  Consequent	  Theron	  (Worcester,	  1788);	  Robert	  A.	  Gross,	  ed.,	  In	  Debt	  to	  
Shays:	  The	  Bicentennial	  of	  an	  Agrarian	  Rebellion	  (Charlottesville	  and	  London,	  
1993).	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  3	  Worthington	  C.	  Ford,	  ed.,	  Journals	  of	  the	  Continental	  Congress,	  1774-­‐1789	  (34	  
vols.,	  Washington,	  1904-­‐1937),	  XXX,	  720-­‐21.	  (Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  JCC).	  
4	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  multiple	  episodes	  of	  popular	  insurrection	  during	  the	  
revolutionary	  and	  post-­‐revolutionary	  periods	  see	  Christian	  Fritz,	  American	  
Sovereigns:	  The	  People	  and	  America’s	  Constitutional	  Tradition	  Before	  the	  Civil	  War	  
(Cambridge	  and	  New	  York,	  2009).	  
5	  On	  internal	  threats	  facing	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  1780s	  see	  Francois	  Furstenberg,	  “The	  
Significance	  of	  the	  Trans-­‐Appalachian	  Frontier	  in	  Atlantic	  History,”	  American	  
Historical	  Review	  113	  (June	  2008),	  647-­‐677;	  Fritz,	  	  American	  Sovereigns.	  
6	  See	  for	  example	  Jeremy	  Adelman,	  “An	  Age	  of	  Imperial	  Revolutions,”	  American	  
Historical	  Review	  113	  (April	  2008),	  319-­‐340;	  Jack	  P.	  Greene,	  Peripheries	  and	  
Centers:	  Constitutional	  Development	  in	  the	  Extended	  Polities	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  
and	  the	  United	  States,	  1607-­‐1788	  (New	  York,	  1984).	  
7	  Oscar	  and	  Mary	  Handlin,	  The	  Dimensions	  of	  Liberty	  (Cambridge,	  1961);	  Louis	  
Hartz,	  The	  Liberal	  Tradition	  in	  America:	  An	  Interpretation	  of	  American	  Political	  
Thought	  since	  the	  Revolution	  (New	  York,	  1955);	  Bernard	  Bailyn,	  Origins	  of	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American	  Politics	  (New	  York,	  1968),	  25,	  101-­‐5;	  Gordon	  Wood,	  Creation	  of	  the	  
American	  Republic	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  1969);	  Gary	  B.	  Nash,	  The	  Unknown	  American	  
Revolution:	  The	  Unruly	  Birth	  of	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Struggle	  to	  Create	  America	  
(New	  York,	  2005);	  Jeffrey	  L.	  Pasley,	  The	  Tyranny	  of	  Printers:	  Newspaper	  Politics	  in	  
the	  Early	  American	  Republic	  (Charlotte,	  2002);	  Joanne	  B.	  Freeman,	  Affairs	  of	  
Honor:	  National	  Politics	  in	  the	  New	  Republic	  (New	  Haven,	  2002);	  David	  
Waldstreicher	  et	  al.,	  Beyond	  the	  Founders:	  New	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Political	  History	  
of	  the	  Early	  American	  Republic	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  2004).	  
8	  Wood,	  Creation	  of	  the	  American	  Republic;	  Jack	  Rakove,	  Original	  Meanings:	  
Politics	  and	  Ideas	  in	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Constitution	  (New	  York,	  1996);	  Lance	  
Banning,	  “The	  Practical	  Sphere	  of	  a	  Republic:	  James	  Madison,	  the	  Constitutional	  
Convention	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Revolutionary	  Federalism,”	  in	  Beyond	  
Confederation:	  Origins	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  American	  National	  Identity,	  eds.	  
Richard	  Beeman,	  Stephen	  Botein,	  Edward	  Carter	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  1987),	  162–87;	  
Pauline	  Maier,	  Ratification:	  The	  People	  Debate	  the	  Constitution,	  1787-­‐1788	  (New	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  York,	  2010).	  See	  also	  Gwenda	  Morgan,	  The	  Debate	  on	  the	  American	  Revolution	  
(Manchester,	  2007).	  
9	  Historians	  of	  treason	  legislation	  have	  emphasized	  growing	  legal	  protections	  
and	  the	  narrowing	  of	  treason	  as	  a	  legal	  category,	  see	  Willard	  Hurst,	  The	  Law	  of	  
Treason	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  Collected	  Essays	  (Westport,	  1971);	  F.	  M.	  Greenwood,	  
“Judges	  and	  Treason	  Law	  in	  Lower	  Canada,	  England,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
during	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  1794–1800,”	  in	  Canadian	  State	  Trials:	  Law,	  Politics	  
and	  Security	  Measures,	  1608–1837,	  eds.	  F.M.	  Greenwood	  and	  B.	  Wright	  (Toronto,	  
1996),	  241.	  The	  few	  scholars	  who	  have	  dealt	  with	  the	  domestic	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
military	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  civilian	  enforcement	  of	  laws.	  See	  David	  E.	  Engdahl,	  
“Soldiers,	  Riots,	  and	  Revolution:	  The	  Law	  and	  History	  of	  Military	  Troops	  in	  Civil	  
Disorders,”	  Iowa	  Law	  Review	  57	  (1971),	  39.	  Robert	  W.	  Coakley,	  The	  Role	  of	  
Federal	  Military	  Forces	  in	  Domestic	  Disorders,	  1789–1878	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  
1988).	  See	  also	  more	  recent	  scholarship	  Clement	  Fatovic,	  Outside	  the	  Law:	  
Emergency	  and	  Executive	  Power	  (Baltimore,	  2009).	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  10	  David	  Waldstreicher,	  Slavery’s	  Constitution:	  From	  Revolution	  to	  Ratification	  
(New	  York,	  2009);	  Paul	  Finkelman,	  Slavery	  and	  the	  Founders:	  Race	  and	  Liberty	  in	  
the	  Age	  of	  Jefferson	  (London,	  1996);	  Jack	  Rakove,	  Original	  Meanings,	  337;	  For	  a	  
notable	  exception	  see	  William	  M.	  Wiecek,	  The	  Guarantee	  Clause	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
Constitution	  (Ithaca	  and	  London,	  1972);	  The	  Sources	  of	  Antislavery	  
Constitutionalism	  in	  America,	  1760-­‐1848	  (1977).	  I	  agree	  with	  these	  scholars	  that	  
slavery	  was	  on	  the	  framers’	  mind	  as	  they	  framed	  the	  emergency	  provisions.	  But	  I	  
disagree	  with	  scholarship	  that	  tends	  to	  ground	  the	  security	  provisions	  entirely	  in	  
fears	  of	  slave	  rebellion.	  I	  contend,	  in	  contrast,	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  slave	  
rebellion	  was	  secondary	  to	  the	  more	  urgent	  and	  ideologically	  contentious	  
problems	  posed	  by	  insurrections	  of	  the	  citizenry,	  which	  were	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  
issue	  of	  right	  and	  might.	  
11	  This	  also	  holds	  true	  for	  older	  histories	  of	  “the	  critical	  period”	  which	  tended	  to	  
emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  Shays’	  Rebellion.	  See	  for	  example	  John	  Fiske,	  The	  Critical	  
Period	  of	  American	  History	  (1888).	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  12	  See	  for	  example	  Woody-­‐Holton,-­‐Unruly-­‐Americans-­‐and-­‐the-­‐Origins-­‐of-­‐the-­‐
Constitution;	  “”Divide	  et	  Impera:”	  “Federalist	  10”	  in	  a	  Wider	  Sphere,”	  William	  and	  
Mary	  Quarterly	  62	  (April	  2005),	  175-­‐212;	  Terry	  Bouton,	  Taming	  Democracy	  
(Oxford	  and	  New	  York,	  2007),	  145-­‐160;	  “A	  Road	  Closed,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  
History	  87	  (December	  2000),	  855-­‐887;	  Robert	  A.	  Gross,	  ed.,	  In	  Debt	  to	  Shays;	  
David-­‐P.	  Szatmary,	  Shays’	  Rebellion;	  Leonard	  L.	  Richards,	  Shays’s	  Rebellion;	  Paul	  
A.	  Gilje,	  Rioting	  in	  America	  (Bloomington,	  1996).	  
13	  See	  Gary	  Gerstle,	  Liberty	  and	  Coercion:	  The	  Paradox	  of	  American	  Government	  
from	  the	  Founding	  to	  the	  Present	  (Princeton,	  2015);	  Ira	  Katznelson,	  “Flexible	  
Capacity:	  The	  Military	  and	  Early	  American	  State	  Building,”	  in	  Shaped	  by	  War	  and	  
Trade:	  International	  Influences	  in	  American	  Political	  Development,	  eds.	  Ira	  
Katznelson	  and	  Martin	  Shefter	  (Princeton,	  2002),	  82-­‐104;	  William	  Novak,	  The	  
People’s	  Welfare:	  Law	  and	  Regulation	  in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  America	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  
1996);	  “The	  Myth	  of	  the	  “Weak”	  American	  State,”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  115	  
(June	  2010),	  752-­‐772;	  Richard	  John,	  Spreading	  the	  News:	  The	  American	  Postal	  
System	  from	  Franklin	  to	  Morse	  (Cambridge,	  1995);	  Brian	  Balogh,	  Government	  Out	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of	  Sight:	  The	  Mystery	  of	  National	  Authority	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  America	  
(Cambridge,	  2009);	  Max	  Edling,	  A	  Revolution	  in	  Favor	  of	  Government:	  Origins	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  American	  State	  (New	  York,	  2003).	  
14	  Much	  like	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Constitution	  cited	  above,	  the	  literature	  on	  
states	  of	  exception	  associated	  with	  Schmitt	  and	  Agamben	  tends	  to	  see	  
emergency	  powers	  as	  highly	  problematic	  for	  liberalism	  and	  constitutional	  rule.	  
Similarly,	  critics	  of	  Schmitt	  and	  Agamben	  tend	  to	  view	  liberalism	  and	  
emergencies	  as	  antithetical.	  See	  for	  example	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  States	  of	  
Exception	  (Chicago,	  2005);	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  Political	  Theology	  (Cambridge,	  1985);	  
Nomi	  Lazar,	  States	  of	  Emergency	  in	  Liberal	  Democracies	  (Cambridge,	  2009);	  
David	  Dyzenhaus,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Law.	  Legality	  in	  a	  Time	  of	  Emergency	  
(Cambridge,	  2006).	  
15	  Liberalism	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  define.	  I	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  constitutional	  
liberalism	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  constitutional	  government	  
and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  such	  as	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  seperation	  of	  powers,	  
popular	  representation	  and	  its	  instruments	  (including	  periodic	  elections),	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  limited	  government,	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  religion,	  protection	  of	  private	  
property	  rights,	  and	  other	  institutional	  mechanisms	  to	  prevent	  state	  power	  from	  
becoming	  despotic.	  The	  liberal	  US	  Constitution	  provided	  the	  foundation	  to,	  and	  
prospectively	  created,	  the	  central	  state	  in	  America	  as	  a	  liberal	  state	  based	  on	  
these	  principles.	  For	  liberal	  states	  see	  John	  Brewer,	  The	  Sinews	  of	  Power:	  War,	  
Money,	  and	  the	  English	  State,	  1688-­‐1783	  (New	  York,	  1989);	  Ira	  Katznelson,	  
“Flexible	  Capacity:	  The	  Military	  and	  Early	  American	  State	  Building,”	  82-­‐104;	  and	  
Gary	  Gerstle,	  Liberty	  and	  Coercion,	  1-­‐30.	  
16	  See	  Hugh	  Heclo,	  Modern	  Social	  Politics	  in	  Britain	  and	  Sweden:	  From	  Relief	  to	  
Income	  Maintainence	  (2011),	  305;	  Margot	  Canaday,	  The	  Straight	  State:	  Sexuality	  
and	  Citizenship	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  America	  (Princeton,	  2011),	  3.	  	  
17	  Pauline	  Maier,	  “Popular	  Uprisings	  and	  Civil	  Authority,”	  William	  and	  Mary	  
Quarterly	  27	  (December	  1970),	  3-­‐35.	  See	  also	  Maier,	  Resistance	  and	  Revolution:	  
Colonial	  Radicals	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  American	  Opposition	  to	  Britain,	  1765-­‐
1776	  (New	  York,	  1992).	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  18	  This	  was	  of	  course	  not	  a	  complete	  transformation.	  Most	  importantly,	  
Americans	  had	  never	  taken	  kindly	  to	  slave	  resistance,	  and	  continued	  to	  abhor	  it	  
after	  the	  Revolution.	  
19	  See	  for	  example	  Eliga	  H.	  Gould,	  Among	  the	  Powers	  of	  the	  Earth:	  The	  American	  
Revolution	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  a	  New	  World	  Empire	  (Cambridge,	  2012).	  
20	  Peter	  Onuf,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic:	  Jurisdictional	  Controversies	  in	  the	  
United	  States,	  1775-­‐1787	  (Philadelphia,	  1983),	  xvii.	  
21	  John	  L.	  Brooke,	  “To	  the	  Quiet	  of	  the	  People:	  Revolutionary	  Settlements	  and	  
Civil	  Unrest	  in	  Western	  Massachusetts,	  1775-­‐1789,”	  William	  and	  Mary	  Quarterly	  
46	  (July	  1989),	  425-­‐62.	  
22	  Quoted	  in	  Fritz,	  American	  Sovereigns,	  49.	  See	  also,	  Onuf,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Federal	  
Republic;	  Thomas	  Slaughter,	  The	  Whiskey	  Rebellion	  (New	  York,	  1986);	  Paul	  B.	  
Moyer,	  Wild	  Yankees	  (Ithaca,	  2007);	  Patrick	  Griffin,	  American	  Leviathan:	  Empire,	  
Nation,	  and	  Revolutionary	  Frontier	  (New	  York,	  2007).	  
23	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  the	  example	  of	  Shays’	  Rebellion	  is	  best	  
suited	  for	  this	  purpose.	  Not	  because	  agrarian	  tax	  revolts	  as	  such	  preyed	  more	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  strongly	  on	  the	  framers’	  minds	  than	  other	  varieties	  of	  insurrection.	  Rather	  Shays’	  
was	  the	  rebellion	  largest	  in	  size	  and	  scope	  in	  the	  postrevolutionary	  period,	  and	  it	  
most	  painfully	  exposed	  the	  deficiency	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  power.	  It	  prompted	  a	  
highly	  anxious	  reaction	  from	  the	  most	  influential	  members	  of	  the	  Federalist	  elite.	  
Occurring	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention,	  the	  example	  Shays’	  more	  
than	  any	  other	  was	  injected	  into	  analyses,	  including	  that	  of	  Madison,	  of	  the	  
problem	  posed	  by	  domestic	  disorder	  as	  well	  as	  the	  solutions	  proposed.	  	  
24	  Szatmary,	  Shays’	  Rebellion,	  86.	  
25	  Massachusetts	  and	  James	  Bowdoin,	  An	  Address	  to	  the	  good	  people	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth	  January	  12,	  1787	  (Boston,	  1787).	  
26	  Szatmary,	  Shays’	  Rebellion,	  159.	  
27	  Massachusetts	  and	  James	  Bowdoin,	  A	  Proclamation	  September	  2,	  1786	  
(Boston,	  1786).	  
28	  Massachusetts	  General	  Court,	  An	  address	  from	  the	  General	  Court,	  to	  the	  people	  
of	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Massachusetts	  October	  30,	  1786	  (Boston,	  1786),	  36-­‐38.	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  29	  “Circular	  Letter	  to	  the	  Several	  Towns	  in	  the	  Commonwealth,”	  The	  
Massachusetts	  Centinel,	  September	  13,	  1786.	  William	  Pencak	  argues	  persuasively	  
that	  Adams	  authored	  the	  letter.	  See	  William	  Pencak,	  “Samuel	  Adams	  and	  Shays’	  
Rebellion,”	  The	  New	  England	  Quarterly	  62	  (March	  1989),	  63-­‐74;	  See	  also	  Paul	  M.	  
Thompson,	  “The	  Reaction	  to	  Shays’	  Rebellion,”	  Massachusetts	  Legal	  History	  4	  
(1998),	  37-­‐60;	  John	  K.	  Alexander,	  Samuel	  Adams:	  America's	  Revolutionary	  
Politician	  (Lanham,	  2002),	  191-­‐214;	  Maier,	  The	  Old	  Revolutionaries:	  Political	  
Lives	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Samuel	  Adams	  (New	  York,	  1980);	  Henry	  Knox	  to	  the	  President	  
of	  Congress,	  October	  1,	  3,	  12	  and	  18,	  1786,	  JCC	  XXXI,	  739-­‐40,	  751-­‐53,	  875,	  886-­‐
88;	  Henry	  Knox	  to	  George	  Washington	  October	  23,	  1786,	  in	  The	  Papers	  of	  George	  
Washington.	  Confederation	  Series,	  eds.	  W.	  W.	  Abbot	  and	  Dorothy	  Twohig	  (6	  vols.,	  
Charlottesville,	  1992-­‐1997),	  IV,	  299.	  (Hereafter	  PGW).	  
30	  James	  Bowdoin,	  JCC,	  XXXII,	  93-­‐95;	  See	  also	  Massachusetts	  and	  Bowdoin,	  
Address.	  
31	  “Circular	  Letter	  to	  the	  Several	  Towns	  in	  the	  Commonwealth,”	  The	  
Massachusetts	  Centinel,	  September	  13,	  1786.	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  82	  Edmund	  Randolph,	  “The	  Virginia	  Convention,	  Friday	  June	  6,	  1788,”	  DHRC,	  IX,	  
985.	  
83	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  74,”	  449.	  See	  also	  James	  Madison,	  “Debates,”	  
DHRC,	  X,	  1379-­‐80.	  For	  to	  “secure	  the	  state”	  see	  James	  Wilson,	  The	  Works	  of	  James	  
Wilson,	  ed.,	  Robert	  G.	  McCloskey	  (2	  vols.,	  Cambridge,	  1967),	  II,	  663.	  
84	  “New	  York	  Journal	  February	  7,	  1787,”	  DHRC,	  XX,	  759.	  
85	  “Virginia	  Herald,	  October	  11,”	  DHRC,	  VIII,	  52.	  
86	  “Convention	  Debates,	  January	  25,”	  DHRC,	  VI,	  1346-­‐47.	  
87	  Edmund	  Pendleton	  to	  James	  Madison	  October	  8,	  1787,	  DHRC,	  VIII,	  46.	  
88	  Pelatiah	  Webster,	  “A	  Citizen	  of	  Philadelphia.	  The	  Weaknesses	  of	  Brutus	  
Exposed,	  8	  November,”	  DHRC,	  XIV,	  71.	  
89	  “The	  Protest	  of	  the	  Minority,	  Pennsylvania	  Gazette,	  October	  3,”	  DHRC,	  II,	  156.	  
90	  Patrick	  Henry,	  “Debates,”	  DHRC,	  X,	  954.	  
91	  Webster,	  “A	  Citizen	  of	  Philadelphia.	  The	  Weaknesses	  of	  Brutus	  Exposed,	  
November	  8,”	  73.	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  92	  Bernard	  Kohn,	  Eagle	  and	  Sword:	  The	  Federalists	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  the	  Military	  
Establishment	  in	  America,	  1783-­‐1802	  (New	  York,	  1975);	  Lawrence	  D.	  Cress,	  
Citizens	  in	  Arms:	  The	  Army	  and	  the	  Militia	  in	  American	  Society	  to	  the	  War	  of	  1812	  
(Chapel	  Hill,	  1982);	  John	  Shy,	  “A	  New	  Look	  at	  the	  Colonial	  Militia,”	  William	  and	  
Mary	  Quarterly	  20	  (April	  1963),	  175-­‐185;	  Don	  Higginbotham,	  “The	  Federalized	  
Militia	  Debate.	  A	  Neglected	  Aspect	  of	  Second	  Amendment	  Scholarship,”	  William	  
and	  Mary	  Quarterly	  55	  (January	  1998),	  39-­‐58.	  
93	  See	  for	  example	  Edling,	  A	  Revolution	  in	  Favor	  of	  Government,	  149-­‐162.	  
94	  Randolph,	  “Letter	  on	  the	  Federal	  Constitution,	  October	  16,	  1787,”	  264.	  
95	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  29,”	  182.	  
96	  Edmund	  Randolph,	  “Letter	  on	  the	  Federal	  Constitution,	  October	  16,	  1787,”	  
266.	  
97	  “Convention	  Debates,	  February	  6,”	  DHRC,	  VI,	  1457.	  See	  also	  “Convention	  
Debates,	  February	  4,”	  DHRC,	  VI,	  1418.	  Statements	  such	  as	  these	  are	  sprinkled	  
over	  the	  ratification	  debates,	  particularly	  in	  Massachusetts,	  Virginia	  and	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  Pennsylvania.	  For	  example:	  “Coercion	  is	  necessary	  in	  every	  Government.”	  In	  
“Debates,”	  DHRC,	  IX,	  1009-­‐1010;	  See	  also	  “Debates,”	  DHRC,	  IX,	  1169.	  
98	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  21,”	  138-­‐139.	  
99	  James	  Madison,	  “Debates,”	  DHRC,	  X,	  1274.	  See	  also,	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  
“Federalist	  28,”	  178.	  
100	  Historians	  of	  early	  U.S.	  military	  institutions	  have	  long	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  
Constitution	  granted	  the	  federal	  government	  military	  power	  independent	  of	  the	  
states.	  But	  the	  impetus	  behind	  the	  grant	  of	  military	  power	  is	  usually	  seen	  in	  
external,	  or	  geopolitical,	  terms.	  Echoing	  scholars	  Charles	  Tilly	  and	  John	  Brewer,	  
Max	  Edling	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  fiscal-­‐military	  powers	  were	  granted	  to	  the	  
federal	  government	  because	  of	  the	  external	  pressure	  of	  war	  and	  the	  competitive	  
environment	  of	  the	  international	  system	  of	  states.	  Similarly,	  David	  Hendrickson	  
has	  argued	  that	  these	  powers	  were	  granted	  to	  prevent	  interstate	  rivalries	  among	  
the	  former	  colonies,	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  European	  state	  system	  in	  America.	  See	  
Edling,	  A	  Revolution	  in	  Favor	  of	  Government;	  David	  Hendrickson,	  Peace	  Pact:	  The	  
Lost	  World	  of	  the	  American	  Founding	  (Lawrence,	  2003);	  Kohn,	  Eagle	  and	  Sword;	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  Cress,	  Citizens	  in	  Arms;	  Charles	  Tilly,	  Coercion,	  Capital,	  and	  European	  States,	  AD	  
990-­‐1990	  (Cambridge,	  1990);	  Brewer,	  The	  Sinews	  of	  Power.	  	  
101	  Edmund	  Randolph,	  “The	  Virginia	  Convention,	  Saturday	  June	  7,	  1788,”	  DHRC,	  
IX,	  1016.	  
102	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  23,”	  153-­‐154	  
103	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  25,”	  167.	  See	  also	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  26”	  
and	  “Federalist	  28.”	  
104	  James	  Wilson,	  “Convention	  Debates,”	  DHRC,	  II,	  576-­‐579.	  
105	  James	  Madison,	  “Debates,”	  DHRC,	  X,	  1273;	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  41,”	  
257.	  
106	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  34,”	  208-­‐209;	  “Federalist	  31,”	  195;	  
“Federalist	  30,”	  191.	  
107	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  28,”	  178-­‐179.	  
108	  See	  for	  example	  Cress,	  Citizens	  in	  Arms,	  10-­‐13,	  50-­‐55;	  “An	  Armed	  Community:	  
The	  Origins	  and	  Meaning	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Bear	  Arms,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  
71	  (June	  1984),	  22–42;	  “Radical	  Whiggery	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  Military:	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  Ideological	  Roots	  of	  the	  American	  Revolutionary	  Militia,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  
Ideas	  40	  (1979),	  43;	  E.	  Wayne	  Carp,	  “The	  Problem	  of	  National	  Defense	  in	  the	  
Early	  American	  Republic,”	  in	  The	  American	  Revolution:	  Its	  Character	  and	  Limits,	  
ed.	  Jack	  P.	  Greene	  (New	  York,	  1987),	  20–3.	  
109	  For	  republicanism	  as	  an	  ideology	  based	  on	  strong	  notions	  of	  citizenship,	  
military	  valor,	  civic	  religion,	  and	  the	  priority	  of	  the	  collective	  life,	  see	  Andreas	  
Kalyvas	  and	  Ira	  Katznelson,	  Liberal	  Beginnings:	  Making	  a	  Republic	  for	  the	  
Moderns	  (New	  York,	  2008);	  J.G.A.	  Pocock,	  The	  Machiavellian	  Moment:	  Florentine	  
Political	  Thought	  and	  the	  Atlantic	  Republican	  Tradition	  (Princeton,	  2003);	  Wood,	  
Creation	  of	  the	  American	  Republic.	  For	  the	  plurality	  of	  sources	  of	  late-­‐18th	  
century	  American	  political	  thought	  see	  James	  T.	  Kloppenberg,	  “The	  Virtues	  of	  
Liberalism:	  Christianity,	  Republicanism,	  and	  Ethics	  in	  Early	  American	  Political	  
Discourse,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  74	  (June	  1987),	  9-­‐33;	  and	  Isaac	  
Kramnick,	  “’The	  Great	  National	  Discussion’:	  The	  Discourse	  of	  Politics	  in	  1787,”	  
William	  and	  Mary	  Quarterly	  45	  (January	  1988),	  1-­‐32.	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  110	  Katznelson,	  “Flexible	  Capacity:	  The	  Military	  and	  Early	  American	  State	  
Building,”	  82-­‐105;	  Brewer,	  The	  Sinews	  of	  Power;	  Michael	  Braddick,	  State	  
Formation	  in	  Early	  Modern	  England,	  1550-­‐1700	  (Cambridge	  and	  New	  York,	  
2000),	  10,	  68;	  David	  Beetham,	  The	  Legitimation	  of	  Power	  (London,	  1991),	  10-­‐11.	  
111	  For	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  ratification	  see	  Kramnick,	  “The	  Great	  National	  
Discussion;”	  and	  Maier,	  Ratification:	  The	  People	  Debate	  the	  Constitution,	  1787-­‐
1788	  (New	  York,	  2011).	  
112	  Refer	  to	  footnotes	  33-­‐39.	  
113	  See	  particularly	  Pocock,	  Politics,	  Language,	  and	  Time:	  Essays	  on	  Political	  
Thought	  and	  History	  (Chicago,	  1989),	  110-­‐121;	  “Machiavelli,	  Harrington	  and	  
English	  Political	  Ideologies	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Century,”	  William	  and	  Mary	  
Quarterly	  22	  (October	  1965),	  549-­‐583;	  R.J.	  Smith,	  The	  Gothic	  Bequest:	  Medieval	  
Institutions	  in	  British	  Thought,	  1668-­‐1863	  (Cambridge,	  1987);	  Mark	  Goldie,	  “The	  
Roots	  of	  True	  Whiggim,”	  History	  of	  Political	  Thought	  1	  (1980),	  212-­‐215.	  See	  also	  
Bernard	  Manin,	  Principles	  of	  Representative	  Government	  (New	  York	  and	  
Cambridge,	  1997),	  46;	  E.	  S.	  Staveley,	  Greek	  and	  Roman	  Voting	  (Ithaca,	  1972).	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  114	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  276.	  
115	  Ibid;	  See	  also	  JCC,	  XXXIII,	  721.	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  28.”	  
116	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  276;	  James	  Madison,	  “Vices	  of	  the	  Political	  
System	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	  350-­‐352.	  
117	  See	  for	  example,	  “Federal	  Farmer,	  Letters	  to	  the	  Republican,	  November	  8,”	  
DHRC,	  XIV,	  29;	  “Debates,”	  DHRC,	  X,	  1274,	  1299;	  “Debates,”	  DHRC,	  X,	  1300-­‐1301;	  
“Brutus,”	  DHRC,	  XIV,	  301;	  “Brutus,”	  DHRC,	  XIII,	  419;	  “A	  Citizen	  of	  Maryland,”	  
DHRC,	  XVII,	  89-­‐92;	  “Agrippa,”	  DHRC,	  XII,	  457-­‐462;	  “A	  Ploughman,”	  DHRC,	  VIII,	  
508.	  For	  the	  Anti-­‐Federalists	  see	  Saul	  Cornell,	  The	  Other	  Founders:	  Anti-­‐
Federalism	  and	  the	  Dissenting	  Tradition	  in	  America,	  1788-­‐1828	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  
1999).	  
118	  Anonymous	  letter	  written	  by	  Baron	  von	  Steuben	  and	  printed	  in	  New	  York	  
Daily	  Adsvertiser,	  reprinted	  in	  John	  M.	  Palmer,	  General	  von	  Steuben	  (New	  Haven,	  
1937),	  339-­‐340.	  
119	  JCC,	  XXXIII,	  721.	  
120	  Refer	  to	  footnotes	  9	  and	  15.	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  121	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  51,”	  347.	  
122	  James	  Madison,	  “Vices	  of	  the	  Political	  System	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	  350-­‐352.	  
123	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  276.	  
124	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  276-­‐277.	  
125	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  276-­‐277;	  See	  also	  James	  Madison,	  “Vices	  of	  
the	  Political	  System	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	  350-­‐352;	  Max	  Farrand,	  Records,	  I,	  318.	  
126	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  277;	  Max	  Farrand,	  Records,	  I,	  356;	  Records,	  II,	  
124.	  
127	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  276-­‐277.	  
128	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  277;	  Max	  Farrand,	  Records,	  I,	  356;	  Records,	  II,	  
124.	  
129	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  21,”	  140.	  
130	  James	  Madison,	  “Federalist	  43,”	  277;	  Max	  Farrand,	  Records,	  I,	  356;	  Records,	  II,	  
124.	  
131	  Hamilton	  was	  even	  more	  direct.	  In	  Federalist	  19	  through	  21,	  Hamilton	  argued,	  
without	  a	  single	  reference	  to	  majority	  will,	  that	  the	  authority	  and	  “existence	  of	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  the	  State	  constitutions”	  and	  the	  Federal	  Constitution	  were	  paramount.	  He	  spoke	  
of	  “insurgents”	  and	  “usurpers”	  as	  illegitimate,	  and	  “friends	  and	  supporters	  of	  the	  
government”	  as	  legitimate,	  but	  without	  factoring	  in	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  each	  
faction,	  that	  is	  of	  which	  body	  constituted	  a	  majority	  of	  citizens.	  See	  for	  example	  
Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  21,”	  140. 
132	  Refer	  to	  footnotes	  85-­‐90	  and	  104-­‐107.	  
